

The African National Congress and Local Democracy: the role of the ANC branch in Manzini- Mbombela.

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By

Musawenkosi Hemelton Malabela

Student No: 0317435t

Supervisor:

Prof. Roger Southall

DECLARATION

I, Musawenkosi Malabela declare that this research report is my unaided work. It is submitted as part of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Sociology) by Coursework and Research Report at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted for any other degree or examination at any other university.

Signed: _____

25 August 2011

Dedicated:

To my parents Athalia Nana Malabela and Malavi Willie Malabela

List of Abbreviations:

ANC	African National Congress
ANC YL	African National Congress Youth League
ANC WL	African National Congress Women's League
BEC	Branch Executive Committee
BGM	Bi-annual Branch General Meeting
BTT	Branch Task Team
CLO	Community Liaising Officer
COPE	Congress of the People
COSAS	Congress of South African Student
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Union
DA	Democratic Alliance
NEC	National Executive Committee
NGC	National General Council
PEC	Provincial Executive Committee
POA	Programme of Action
REC	Regional Executive Committee
SACP	South African Communist Party
SG	Secretary General

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Chapter 1:

1.1 Research Topic

The African National Congress (ANC) and local democracy: the role of the ANC branch in Manzini- Mbombela.

1.2 Introduction: Rationale and research aims- The role of the branch within the ANC

This study seeks to understand the role of the ANC branch and how it relates to municipalities. Does the ANC branch have influence regarding the decisions that are made by the municipalities, especially ANC led Municipalities? What is the role of an ANC branch, why is it significant in the party? To what extent are policies formulated at local or branch level? This study will look at one particular branch. The ANC constitution does not spell out the role that the ANC branch should play in ANC led municipalities and this study will seek to research the role that the ANC branch plays in regard to Local Government by undertaking a case study of Manzini (Chochocho) ANC branch and Mbombela Municipality.

The media and the opposition parties, especially the Democratic Alliance (DA), have argued that the relationship between the ANC and municipalities is a corrupt one and opens opportunity for patronage networks. Formally, the relationship between the ANC and municipality is supposed to be free of political interference, but the media has suggested that in ANC-led councils there is political interference, notably in the appointment of municipal managers, deployment of ANC members as officials, and their awarding of tenders.

Research that has been done on the ANC and local government hitherto has focused particular upon the ward system. It has largely paid attention to the causes of the dysfunctionality of the ward system in failing to meet people's needs and bringing about service delivery. Thus Banit-Gbaffou (2008 & 2009), Piper & Deacon (2009) Smith (2008) and Putu (2006) have all focused and on how the ward system has failed in ANC wards and they cite patronage networks, political-clientelism, the dominant party syndrome and the limited power that the councillors have as the causes for the dysfunctionality of the ward

system. In contrast, they do not have much to say regarding the actual branch structure of the ANC and how it relates to the ward system or to local government in general, and the influence that it might have in shaping decisions that councils make. This study sets itself the task of filling in this gap, by looking at the role of the ANC branch in relation to local government. It seeks to understand a particular branch and how it functions.

This research serves as an extension of my honour's paper which looked at the ward system as introduced by the ANC-led government as a mechanism to enhance participatory democracy. With this in mind, the aim of this study is to explore some of the roles of the ANC branch by referring to the roles of political parties as highlighted by Tordoff (1993). These include party's functions of mobilization and reconciliation, integration, patronage, communication, and policy formulation and execution. This research sets itself the task of trying to understand whether and how the ANC branch carries out these roles. It also seeks to understand how the ANC branch relates to local government: does the ANC branch have a say in the allocation of resources by the municipality? Does it have a say or influence regarding who gets what?

One of the important motivations for undertaking this study is to explore the implications of what Jacob Dlamini (2010) terms the "Polokwane narrative". This argues that Jacob Zuma's victory in Polokwane was due to the revitalization of branches which claimed back the ANC from the technocratic Thabo Mbeki. According to the media and some in the ANC, the Zuma presidency was due to ANC branches that voted for him. According to Dlamini (2010), the Polokwane narrative depicts branches as uniform, but this is not the case. Julius Malema, ANC Youth League president in his quest to nationalize mines has emphasized the importance of the branches in policy formulation. "We don't want Zuma's or [Deputy Police Minister Fikile] Mbalula's support... we want the support of the masses. If the masses say you are correct, we will march on',... Malema was determined to influence ANC branches to make nationalization party policy, which would then filter into the government" (*The Times*, 19/02/2010). With much emphasis on the role of the branch in policy formulation, this study seeks to understand this role of the branch in regards to ANC municipalities by focusing on one branch. As such it does not wish to generalize from this particular case study but to offer

an in-depth understanding of a particular ANC branch post-Polokwane, by looking at the Manzini (Chochocho) Branch of the ANC.

Manzini is part of the Mbombela Municipality in the Mpumalanga Province. It consists of two Trusts named ChoChoCho, and Phola and some parts of a third, Swalala, all under the Masoyi Tribal Authority. A Trust is an area under the jurisdiction of the Tribal Authorities and is an informal method of granting stand ownership to inhabitants. Manzini has a population of 17693 people living in it (Census: 2001) and has about 1700 stands. It was established in 1953 and it is multi-cultural, with Swati being the dominant group. However, it also has Stonga, Zulu, Sotho, and Shona people from Zimbabwe. It can be classified as a rural area and like most other rural areas there is a high level of unemployment and lack of community facilities like libraries, stadiums and recreational facilities. The housing architectural planning is quite diverse; from shacks, RDP houses to well structured houses. It has limited infrastructure but there is electricity, running water, tarred roads with potholes, schools which are accessible and a clinic.

Politically it is dominated by the ANC. In the recent (22 May 2009) general elections the party received an overwhelming majority of 96.01% in the ward, which shows that the ANC is the dominant party in the ward. In Mpumalanga, the ANC received 85.55% of the votes, the highest level of votes it obtained in all nine other provinces. Mbombela Municipality, the municipality under which this branch falls is also dominated by the ANC; out of the 36 ward councillors in the municipality 33 are ANC councillors and only 3 are DA councillors (<http://www.mbombela.gov.za/36%20wards.pdf>), which marks the dominance of the party in the council.

One of the problems and challenges of branches noted by Kgalema Mothlanthe, when he was still Secretary General of the ANC, in his organizational report for 2007 was that branches in rural areas because of their large size fail to convene meetings (Organisational report Presented to the 52nd National Conference in Polokwane by Kgalema Mothlante: 2007). Thus I choose a rural branch to look at the issues concerned in convening regular branch meetings

and what are the issues that are discussed in such meetings: do they offer members the democratic space to participate in decision making or are they just implementing national mandates? It is the objective of this study to try and uncover the significance of the ANC branch to try and understand the Polokwane Narrative that Dlamini alludes to, by focusing on one rural branch of the ANC.

The ANC, established in 1912, in its first constitution drafted in 1919, declared that it shall consist of National congress, Provincial Congress, District and Local Branches. In the 1953 constitution it declared that: “[t]he basic unit of the organization in the Congress shall be the branch” (ANC Constitution, 1958: 11). Subsequent constitutions of the ANC have stressed the importance of the ANC branch as a basic unit of the organization. The 1991 constitution of the ANC adds that no member of the ANC shall belong or serve the movement without belonging to a branch and it give the Branch Executive the right to accept and refuse new members. “But such acceptance and refusal shall be subject to review by the higher organs of the ANC” (ANC Constitution, 2002: 5). Even though the branches’ decisions about membership application are subject to review, the branch clearly plays a potentially significant role as gatekeeper.

The branch shall be: “the place where members exercise the basic democratic right to discuss and formulate policies” (ANC Constitution, 1994: 19). The organization’s internal democracy is experienced at the branch level where members are offered a chance to formulate policies. However, it is recognized that in practice the internal democratic functioning of the party is less than perfect. As noted by Kgalema Mothlante in his 2007 organizational report: “[w]hereas the role of leadership is to guide and provide direction to branches, during times of electoral contestation, certain leaders abuse their position and impose predetermined decisions and outcomes on branches, thus violating the democratic principle that these decisions are the prerogative of the members of the ANC, organized through their branches” (Organisational report presented to the 52nd National Conference in Polokwane by Kgalema Mothlante: 2007). This implies that the nomination process undermines the democratic principle of the branch as 90 percent of the delegates that vote at congresses are from branches. But this does not define the role of the ANC branch in relation to local government which is what this study seeks to uncover.

Against the background of the formal role of the branch as laid down by the ANC's constitution, this thesis seeks to understand the reality of the branch, the role of the ANC branch in practice. What does the ANC branch look like in reality? Is it the real 'basic unit' of the organization and how does it fit in the whole ANC structure? These are some of the questions that this thesis seeks to explore.

The ANC is committed to the notion of participatory democracy and this is evident with the establishment of the branch, which every piece of legislation of the party alludes to as the 'basic unit' of the organisation. Equally it supplements the notion of participatory democracy with one of representative democracy, which is about electing of leaders to the upper structures of the organisation. Does the representative democracy which is about the election of leaders, leads to the domination of leaders, which elite theorists like Michels (1958) allude to? What this thesis seeks to do, in part, therefore is to examine whether the ANC branch works to promote participatory democracy and or whether it, in contrast, it serves as a vehicle of top-down domination of elites.

Chapter 2: Literature Review & Methodological Considerations

2.1 Literature Review

“The mass will never rule except *in abstracto*” Michels (1958: 419).

Does this mean that democracy in the real sense of the word, ‘the rule of the people’ or ‘power by the people’, cannot be achieved? Does the election of leaders mark the only democracy that people might have? Is democracy only realised during election of leaders and government? Can we imagine a party without leaders where every decision has to go through the scrutiny of the masses? Michels’ (1958) iron law of oligarchy and elite democracy theory offer a clear (if disillusioning) perspective on how leaders come to dominate within democratic political parties.

The ANC, while embracing ideals of participatory democracy, is more realistically based on the notion of representative democracy, that is, that its membership will choose leaders to represent them. Thus even though it refers the branch as the ‘basic unit’ of the organisation, in practice it does not mean that the branches are running the organisation. The ANC is not run by branches but by Luthuli House where the national leadership of the organisation make decisions that affect the general membership of the movement. Branches, as noted in the constitution of the ANC, elect 90 percent of the delegates that vote in elective congresses, meaning that the masses only have the power to choose and select who is to lead them and they acknowledge the fact that they cannot lead as a whole. However, it is Robert Michels’ elite democracy that can help us in understanding the role of the branch and its significance. What is the role of the branch, does it have power to shape the decisions that are made by the top elite of the organisation? How democratic is the ANC? Does the branch offer members of the organisation the space to exercise their democratic right? These are some of the questions that this paper poses and will seek to answer with the help of elite democracy theory.

The ANC constitution provides for the election of leaders who are then meant to implement policies of the organisation which are decided at congresses or conferences of the movement held every five years. However, elite democracy theorists like Michels (1958) argue that these leaders who are democratically elected tend to dominate political parties. Once elected, they become distant from the masses and the masses tend to leave the day-to-day running of the party to these leaders, who then dominate the party. This thesis will try and explore the reality of democracy on the floor of the ANC by looking at an ANC branch

Michels (1958) notes that even though political parties start off with democratic principles they become oligarchic, meaning that they are dominated by a few leaders as the party realises that it is not possible for the members as a whole to run the party. “The political party, is founded in most cases on the principle of the majority, and is founded always on the principle of the masses” (Michels 1958: 5). The party in this sense is meant to be democratic, based on democracy which Swift (2002: 39) argues “[i]n the original Greek, democracy is the *kratos* of the *demos* – the power of the people”. The masses that the party was founded on as the party grows delegate their powers to the leaders of the organisation as it becomes impossible for the party to be run by the mass. The masses merely become voters of leaders who represent them. As Swift (2002: 48) notes, “[v]oters must understand that once they have elected an individual, political action is his [sic] business and not theirs. This means that they must refrain from instructing him about what he is to do”. The democratic founding notion of the party is by this very fact that the masses are no longer eligible to instruct their leaders on how to govern them, shows that the very founding principle of the organisation is undermined. Thus Michels speaks of the iron law of oligarchy, that the elected leaders of the party become detached from the needs of the masses.

By using the notion of ‘iron law of oligarchy’, Michels (1958) is offering a critique of representative democracy, which is deemed by many democratic theorists as the best form of democracy. As Southall (2010: 9) notes, democracy which “[l]iterally speaking,...means ‘rule by the people’, yet this is regarded by democratic theorists as an unrealisable ideal. As noted by Norman Barry (1989: 261) this is because, on the one hand, ‘direct democracy’ – ‘a system in which decision-taking and law-making is a function of the whole community unmediated by any form of representation’ – is impossible to achieve in all but the smallest of

societies. On the other hand, the idea of people ‘ruling’ over themselves implies that the majority will prevail, which on the basis that all people are deemed to enjoy political equality, tends to take us back to the idea of elections and representative democracy”. Michels (1958) argues that representative democracy leads to the domination by leaders which in turn undermines the democratic principle of the organisation. Leaders, he argues, utilise organisational legitimacy, structures and authority to subvert control from below within political parties and use the power invested in them by the masses for their own gains. Is this the case for the ANC, in particular the ANC branch, do leaders use the branch to further or advance their interests or do they serve the needs of the people? Thus this paper seeks to understand how leaders who are elected at the branch level to represent the masses carry-out this task, do they dominate the masses and push their own agenda or serve the masses? What is the role of leaders in branches?

This paper will thus refer to the notion of elite democracy to understand the role of the branch and how the elite uses the branch to maintain their positions of power. Does the branch have any power in the decision making processes of the ANC? What is the significance of the branch? Is the branch only in existence to legitimise and elect leaders or is it there to shape policies of the ANC? Michels (1958) argues that the masses’ only role is to elect representatives to represent their interest, which as the elite assume power is displaced by that of the leaders. The need for leadership in the organisation, he proposes, stems from the mechanical and technical impossibility of direct government by the people or the masses. “There are, however, other reasons of a technical and administrative character which render impossible the direct-self government of large groups” (Michels, 1958: 31). Leaders are elected to undertake administrative tasks, which inevitably undermines the democratic principle of the party. What is of most importance is that the masses agree to the election of these leaders to carry-out these tasks.

“Schumpeter understood that the role of the people in political decision making was inevitably limited. It was simply not realistic for people with relatively little knowledge or understanding to become continuously involved in complex political argument. Rather, he observed, their role is reduced to being able to choose freely between different groups of politicians each presenting competing sets of policies” (McNaughton, 1996: 97). Michels (1958) thus argues that the masses or party members become merely voters of leaders. The

objective of this paper is to explore, whether the ANC branch, where the majority of the members are based, really operates to provide for the masses to choose their leaders or whether it retains leverage as an organ for the masses to actively participate in the formulation of policies that have to be adopted and prepared by the party.

The ousting of Mbeki in Polokwane and the Zuma victory which many have argued was due to the members of branches with the help of the alliance partners (SACP & Cosatu) highlights the importance of the branches in selecting leaders of the organisation. Michels would explain what happened in Polokwane as a replacement of one elite with another. Further, he would argue that this was a normal event, comparable to similar occurrences in other parties and that the masses (branches) did what masses do in modern political parties, that is, choosing leaders. The masses are merely voters of the leaders of the party. But are the masses really merely voters of the leaders? This is one of the questions that this paper will try and answer to find out: what is in the importance of the branch and what is in it for people to participate in the branch?

Why do parties need leaders? Michels (1958) notes that “[i]n the life of the modern democratic parties we may observe signs of indifference. It is only a minority which participates in party decisions, and sometimes that minority is ludicrously small” (p55). The reason why decisions are made by a minority is that the masses are not keen to participate in the routine life of the organisation and see the need for leaders. Thus he notes that “the majority is really delighted to find persons who will take trouble to look after its affairs. In the mass, and even in the organized mass of the labour parties, there is an immense need for direction and guidance” (Michels, 1958: 58). Even so, the masses do not voluntarily or consciously surrender their power to the leaders, yet once leaders assume administrative positions, they dominate the everyday affairs of the organisation. Democracy is not delivered to the masses by the elite but the elite instead dominates the party and undermines the democratic principle of the party. This study will try to explore these issues in relation to the ANC branch. How democratic is the branch? Do people participate in the routine life of the branch? Do the branch members see the need for leaders? And what are the issues that encourages people to attend branch meetings?

“In a letter from Marx to Schweitzer we are told that in Germany, where the workers are bureaucratically controlled from birth upwards, and for this reason have blind faith in constituted authority, it is above all necessary to teach them to walk by themselves” (Michels, 1958: 60). Marx, who himself was a workers’ leader, saw the dangers that leadership implied for the political project of the working class. So we need to ask: is the ANC branch a way the ANC wants to democratise the party by teaching the masses to walk for themselves? Or has it become an instrument of elite domination? In theory, at least, because the branch is rooted in the masses, and value is put on the promotion of internal party democracy. But what is the reality?.

2.1.1 Elections, Political Participation and Leadership

Michels (1958) argues that the leaders, when they assume positions of power, disconnect themselves from the masses by forming a new elite whose interests do not converge with those of the masses. They thus become a new class, based on the fact that they make decisions for the majority: thus the ‘democratic’ party becomes an oligarchy. “The people are the ‘consumers’ of the politics while the elite are the ‘producers’. The consumers may choose between competing products in the store, but have little influence over their design and production” (McNaughton, 1996: 97). The masses in this view are merely consulted when they have to elect or choose the product that they want without actually dictating how it should be produced. The elite are bestowed with the power to decide on how the product should be produced. Thus, this paper will also seek to uncover the issues that are discussed in ANC meetings: are they about policy formulation or leadership? Is the branch where policies are formulated and discussed or is it used for instrumental by elites or would be elites?

“It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, say oligarchy” Michels (1958: 418). He continues and argues that “[e]very party organization represents an oligarchical power grounded upon a democratic basis. We find everywhere electors and the elected. Also we find everywhere that the power of the elected leaders over the electing masses is almost unlimited. The oligarchical structure of the building suffocates the basic democratic principle” (Michels, 1958: 418). Elite democracy theory offers us a great deal of understanding of political parties and how they function and the role of both the

leaders and the members of the party and how democracy which many proclaim to champion is undermined by the very structure of the organisation. This paper will try to make sense of the ANC branch by drawing from this theory, seeking to understand how the branch is influenced by the leaders of the upper structures of the organisation and whether the branch has the power that the ANC constitution claims. It seeks to uncover where power lies within the ANC. How true is it that the branch, as declared by the constitution of the ANC, is the 'basic unit of the party'? What is the role of the branch in the ANC? Does it enhance democracy within the organisation? How does the branch promotes local democracy? What are the main functions of the branch? Why is it important for the ANC to have branches?

"Modern political and social science has clearly inherited the distrust of ordinary people and their capacity to participate in their self-governance...Participation (except passively during elections) is not to be encouraged" (Swift, 2002: 43). As mentioned above, the masses only have the chance to participate in politics of the party when election comes and this is when the elite descend to the masses to appeal for re-election. Swift (2002) notes of the elite democracy theorists such as Michels, Mosca and Pareto that they all converged on the 'iron law of oligarchy', that is, they "postulate... that democracy was undermined by the inevitable rise of an elite in any complex organisation whether a modern political party or government" (Swift, 2002: 46). Democracy, then, is never to be fully realised. Even if parties and government argue that they are democratic, the rise of the elite will undermine the will of the people which becomes the will of the few. Democracy for the masses then becomes either the change or endorsement of the leadership of the party, and democracy in its classic sense, rule by the people, is never achieved. It only exists in abstraction. Is this abstraction of democracy what is happening at the ANC? Does democracy for the ANC mean that the people in their branch only participate or realise democracy when elections come for them to mobilise for the party or when they have to change the old for the new guard of the party?

"Gaetano Mosca declares that no highly developed social order is possible without a "political class," that is to say, a politically dominant class, the class of minority" (Michels, 1958: 393). For C. Wright Mills (1978), writing about 1950s USA, this *political class* is the *power elite* which, as the means of information and of power become centralised, means in effect that some men came to occupy positions in America society from which they could

look down upon, and their decisions mightily affect, the everyday worlds of ordinary men and women: “The power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environment of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences” (p3-4). Mills, unlike the other democratic elite theorists, was speaking of the influence that people who control the military and large corporations have on the lives of the majority and how they use their economic power and the control of the means of violence to influence political decisions that governments makes. Mills proposed that the elite of political parties makes decisions for the masses and their power lies in the fact that they have the power to determine the will of the people. Thus Michels (1958) notes that when the elite comes to power, their interests no longer coincide with those of the masses, for they develop their own interests and become a class of their own. Democracy in the party is then undermined and the elite reign supreme. However, the masses still form the core of the party because without them there would not be a party to give birth to the elite. What is the significance of the masses one might then ask? As highlighted above it is to mobilise and elect the leadership.

“In a party, it is far from obvious that the interests of the masses which form the party will coincide with the interests of the bureaucracy in which the party becomes personified” (Michels, 1958: 406). The party which becomes bureaucratised by the political elite tends to have a clash of interest with the masses. The latter tend to be conservative when the former, at times, might call for radical action. From this perspective, it is important is to explore whether this pessimistic viewpoint prevails for all political parties, particularly in South Africa today, and whether the ANC in particular maintains a bottom-up democratic approach or whether it has fallen prey to domination by elites.

2.1.2 The Role of Political Parties

Why do we need political parties and what is their role?

“Parties are instruments of collective human action and creatures of the political elite – either politicians trying to control governments or government elites trying to control the masses. In competitive systems, parties are organized by politicians to win elections; in authoritarian systems, parties are organized to affect the attitudes and

behaviors of the population. In both instances, an organizational structure must be forged, money must be raised, cadres recruited, officers elected or selected, and procedures for internal governing established and agreed upon. In short, party building has a logic of its own” (Wiener, 1967, 1-2 cited in Mohamed-Salih, 2003: 3).

This assertion applies for parties in both the West and in Africa. The main objective of political parties, Mohamed-Salih (2003) argues, is to control state power. Political parties thus have a variety of roles.

Legitimation

Randall (1988) notes that one of the roles or functions of political parties is that “[t]hey endow regimes with legitimacy by providing ideologies, leadership or opportunities for political participation, or a combination of all three” (cited in Mohamed-Salih, 2003: 4). Tordoff (1993) also notes the legitimizing function of political parties; he argues that a political party, through elections that are declared free and fair, legitimizes governments. Political parties are therefore essential in legitimizing governance; political elites thus rely on the parties to legitimize their governance.

Institutionalisation

“[P]olitical parties, whether in multi-party or single-party regime, are the key to political stability; [they] offer the means of political ‘institutionalization’, or the containment of pressures for participation. The party was the only modern organization which can become a source of authority. In this sense, it is the party that creates the state” (Huntington 1968:91 cited in Randall, 1988: 2). The party then becomes a source of authority by the virtue of the fact that it both institutionalizes participation and contains it. In this sense, political parties are based on participation of the members and the members are the ones that deliver the state into elite hands.

Mobilisation and Reconciliation

Mass mobilisation is one of the functions that political scientists have noted as the significant role of political parties. “Political parties are the most important institutions of political mobilisation in the context of mass politics...The objective of parties may be many and varied, seeking revolutionary change or maintaining the status quo, but they all require the mobilisation of mass support” (Smith, 2009: 109). Suffice to say of the mobilisation function is that parties need the masses to govern, they need the consent of the masses which then legitimises their power in government. The party, in order to get the support of the masses, must appeal to them and needs to be seen on the ground where the masses reside (Tordoff 1993). Likewise for Huntington (1968: 408) “[t]he stability of modernizing political parties systems depends on the strength of its political parties. A party, in turn, is strong to the extent that it has to institutionalize mass support”. Political parties must be able to mobilize people to rally behind the party and by so doing they may be able to legitimize governments. The mobilization function of the political party is crucial because for parties to win elections they need people to vote for them which in turn legitimize their government.

Anthony Butler (2009) in his study of the 2009 South African elections notes that “[t]he movement (the ANC) instituted a controversial Imvuselelo campaign soon after the 2004 elections, avowedly to renew branches, increase membership, enhance the ANC’s ‘mass character’, build organisational and administrative capacity, and recruit white, Indians and Coloured activists. It was controversial because it was interpreted as a plot both by and against incumbent Thabo Mbeki” (2009:73). The mobilization strategy of the ANC was an attempt to revive branches and this is what some believe is what led to the presidency of Jacob Zuma in Polokwane. “At the heart of the ANC’s approach, however, lay an old-fashioned exploitation of the advantages of a mass political party. Luthuli House ensured that branches were revitalised in good times for elections. It relied heavily upon large number of volunteers to undertake door-to-door canvassing. It was this, above all that encouraged eligible electors to register and then vote” (Butler, 2009: 65). The branch did not only put Zuma as the party’s president but it also assured him the presidency of the Republic. Butler (2009) notes that out of all the campaign strategies that were employed in the run-up to the 2009 election, the door-to-door campaign was the most successful one. This in turn implies the importance for the ANC of branches for mobilising the masses at times of elections.

Policy Formulation

Tordoff (1993) also notes policy formation as one of the significant roles of political parties. For Randall (1988: 183-7) likewise, “[t]hey provide opportunities for the formation of coalitions of powerful political interests to sustain government (interest aggregation), have major influences on policies as a result of devising programmes, supervise policy implementation, political socialization or mobilization of the people to undertake self-help activities”. Political parties are a mechanism or a vehicle which citizens can use to formulate policies and, in theory, make sure that they are implemented.

This project has thus sets itself the task of, by using Manzini branch as a case study, indicating whether and how ANC branches influence policies that Local Governments or Municipalities that are governed by the ANC make. This is particularly pertinent given that, authors such as Randall argue that “there is a great deal of evidence that parties usually have minimal impact on public policy in Third World countries, and even more rarely exercise any effective supervision of policy implementation”.

Integration

Tordoff (1993:98) notes that the party plays a major role in integrating the nation and managing any ethnic, racial, religious or other cleavages. In South Africa, where there is a diversity of racial and ethnic groups, the ANC appears to play a massive role in carrying out this integrative function. Thus it calls itself a non-racial party and is not based on any ethnic group. The aims and objectives of the ANC includes “[u]niting all the people of South Africa, Africans in particular from all forms of discrimination and national oppression...and transform South Africa as rapidly as possible into a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society ...Build a South African nation with common patriotism and loyalty in which the cultural, linguistic and religious diversity of the people is recognized” (ANC Constitution. 2007: 3). In an area where there are diverse ethnic groups and races the ANC branch might play this integrative role, to maintain conflict amongst different groupings.

Patronage

If political parties and their ruling elites need to access state power to secure their interests and maintain their domination, then they have to offer the voter something in return. Benit-Gbaffou (2010) refers to this as political-clientelism, which she defines as ‘as the exchange of public goods for public support’, arguing that this is crucial for governments to hold on to power.

“Historically, the patronage function of political parties has been important and in some cases remains so today, especially multiparty states where parties promise future patronage in return for electoral support” (Tordoff, 1993: 107). Patronage networks are then used to win elections. This is one functions of the party that many researchers have established in studying the ANC wards. Randall (1988:183-7) notes that political parties in Africa “act[s] as a medium for political recruitment, thus creating opportunities for upward mobility” (Cited in Mohamed-Salim, 2001: 4). Political parties offer citizens an opportunity to access state resources through patronage networks and also present others the opportunity to advance their political careers.

Political Communication

Tordoff (1993) notes that the final function of political parties is that of political communication whereby governments (ruling elites) can use the party to communicate with the people and *vice versa*. The ward system, via the introduction of ward committees and ward councillors, was established to fulfil this function. It was going to be mechanism which the people can use to communicate with the local state, with the party (the ANC) playing an important role in this structure.

This research aims to look at how the ANC branch plays out these functions at Local Government level; it seeks to understand the role of the ANC branch in carrying out these functions of political parties. With the ANC having expressed the importance of the branch as the basic unit of the organization, one might expect that the branch has to carry out these above mentioned functions and roles of political parties.

2.1.3 The ANC Branch and Local Government

The ANC constitution (2007: 28) argues that a branch must be “[r]egistered with the PEC (Provincial Executive Committee) and have a minimum of 100 members, provided that the PEC may confer special recognition, where due to exceptional circumstances, that branch has fewer than 100 members”. In Mpumalanga the ANC decided to use the ward structure demarcated by the Municipality to create wards as a mechanism to organise its branches, meaning that in each ward there is one ANC branch. This is one the link that the ANC branch has to local government, because the branch is constructed according to the municipality demarcation of wards. But does this link cause confusion among ordinary people between the ANC branch and the ward? What then is Local government?

Lemon (2002: 19) notes “[t]he local state [local government] is open to democratic pressure and is concerned to provide services in response to needs rather than profit or ability to pay. The local state can therefore be used to achieve real gains and defend real advances.” Local Government in this view is about how people can shape decisions that affect them directly.

Lemon (2002:18) also argues that the need for local government stems from three important factors: “[f]irstly, its bureaucratic nature inevitably requires hierarchal structures that allow decentralization of those functions that are more easily and efficiently administered at local level. Secondly, the state’s needs for legitimacy may be assisted by its acceptance of a degree of local autonomy: hence Nelson Mandela’s comment that ‘the local government elections are a continuation of April 27 [1994] because there cannot be full democracy without democratic local government’ (ANC 1994:8). In certain situations, the central state may also use local government as a means of deflecting the blame for some of its problems down the hierarchy (Dear 1981). Thirdly, uneven development is an important factor influencing the state to organise control of its territory through some degree of local autonomy (Taylor 1993: 322 cited in Lemon 2002: 18). In this case Lemon (2002) notes that the local state or government can be used by the central government as a developmental tool. Arguing that this notion was captured in Mandela’s description of local government as ‘the arms and legs of the Reconstruction and Development Programme [RDP]’ (ANC 1994: 29 cited in Lemon, 2002:18).

According to the ANC, the idea of local government was to bring about people centred development, as it is seen as the sphere of the government closest to the people. “We said to our people, through local government, together with you we shall bring democracy to where you live” (Sydney Mufamadi, cited in Ward Committee Resource Book, 2005: 1). Local government was to “[p]lay a crucial role in building democracy in a future South Africa. Local government will bring government closer to the people and actively involve them in decision-making and planning which affect them...The promotion of the needs and interests of disadvantaged sections of communities will therefore become a major focus of local government activities” (Ready to Govern. 1992:12). The creation of Local Government was about ‘bringing democracy to where people live’, so that people could have a say in decisions that affect their lives directly.

Ballard (2008:168) notes that “[p]articipation has become increasingly important in the rhetoric and practice of local government. As a method it can be used for two major kinds of political purposes. On one hand it can function as an information gathering exercise which better informs officials about the needs of citizens. On the other it allows people to engage government on the best way to meeting social needs”. This is what the ward system is doing through Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). People are offered a voice to engage government but that is not sufficient; government has to respond to that voice if these participatory structures are to function. The service delivery protests are a testimony that giving people a voice without responding to it is not enough. Thus Mattes (2008: 137) notes that “[i]ndeed the timing, location and expression of protest in South Africa generally conveys an image of intense dissatisfaction with local government service delivery amongst the powerless and marginalized”. Peoples’ protests by-passes these participatory structures because they do not respond to people’s needs in terms of service delivery. Protesting offers citizens the only chance to be heard by government. The problem, Mattes (2008) argues, is that councillors and local government officials are accountable and loyal to their party bosses, rather than the people who elected them.

Sabela and Reddy (1996: 12) argue that because ward councillors are elected by the community, they are accountable to it, but equally they are also accountable to the political parties upon whose platform they were elected: that is, "...the council legislator is representative of his party in government and the constituency of the voters that put him in office. As such the councillor cannot claim to have purely been elected purely on his personal and merit or resources. He is fully accountable to the party membership" (Sabela and Reddy 1996: 12). To what degree is the councillor accountable to the masses or the voters and to what extent are they accountable to membership of the party that they were voted in their list as councillor? This is another question that this paper seeks to explore in understanding the notion of accountability, whether the members of the party or the voters come first in the councillor's accountability. According to commentators, "[t]he new local government policy framework is, if nothing else, ambitious. It is a commanding, complex, forward-looking and optimistic manifesto to systematically realize a participatory local governance system that is at the heart of an intergovernmental effort to achieve democratic citizenship, integrated development and reconciliation between the divided communities of South Africa" (Pieterse, E. 2002: 3). Communities through Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) would have a chance for the first time in history to have a say in decisions that municipalities make in regard to service delivery. Furthermore, "The particularly promising aspect of the IDP model is that it seeks to promote a future-oriented, problem-solving approach within local government and the citizenry" (Pieterse, E. 2002: 5). IDPs as stipulated in the White Paper on local government (1998: 39): "provide powerful tools for municipalities to facilitate integrated and co-ordinated delivery within their municipalities". IDPs are supposedly people centred development strategies which integrates residents' voice within municipal planning. Yet while communities may be given a voice through the IDPs, giving citizens a voice and parties and elites responding to that voice is another matter, as would seem to be indicated by the prevalence of service delivery protests in South Africa over the past few years.

2.1.4 The ANC Branch in Relation to Local Government in Manzini- Chochcho

This thesis aims to look at how the ANC branch plays out the functions of political parties at local government level. This is against the background that in 1999 the ANC itself noted that: "[t]he most basic unit of the organisation is the branch and yet that is the weakest link in the chain. From all accounts, our branches are in a sorry state; general members' meetings are rarely called; AGM's rarely take place and in some cases take months to achieve the

necessary quorum; where meetings occur the political content is lacking, with meetings discussing administrative matters only; no clear programme of action and there is no serious participation in community programmes; political life and activism of the branches is close to no existence” (ANC Annual Report. 1999: 3). It is against this background, that the objective here is to understand the life of the ANC branch in one particular locality. Will this particular branch exemplify the sorry state that is highlighted in this quote or not?

It is the intention of this research to also look at the role that the ANC branch plays in Integrated Development Plans (IDP) processes. Are IDP’s about the community influencing decisions that are made by the municipality? Have they offered ANC branches an opportunity to shape decisions that are made by municipal councils? It will do this by looking at the participatory structures that local government has offered notably the ward system, and thereby seek to examine whether and how such participation contains domination by party elites.

This thesis also seeks to explore the relation of the ANC to the municipality as it is not spelt out in the ANC constitution. Its main objective is to try to understand how the ANC relates to municipality and how this relationship, which has regularly been identified as corrupt and about patronage by the media and opposition parties notably the DA, affects service delivery. Do municipal officials try to please their party boss or are they autonomous from the ANC and provide service delivery? What is the influence of the ANC branch in decisions that are made by the municipality? Do the IDPs processes offer the ANC branch a chance to inform decisions that have to be made by the municipality and not about communities engaging municipality on their needs and how to best meet them as IDPs were envisioned? In short, does the ANC branch enhance local democracy? What is the role of the ANC branch in advancing local democracy?

This thesis will also focus on the role of the ANC branch in ensuring that some of this functions of local government are executed, in particular that of legitimizing national government. How is the branch using local government to legitimize the ANC led government in South Africa? Since both local government and the ANC branch are where

people can exercise their democratic right and closest to the people, how do they relate to each other, what influence does the branch have in municipal decision making? These are some of the questions that this study will try to uncover with regards to the ANC branch and Local Government.

2.2 Methodological Considerations

To understand local democracy and the link between the ANC branch and the municipality I employed a variety of research instruments which included interviews, document analysis and being a non-participant observer in ANC meetings. This section of the thesis details why these research instruments were employed and some of the experiences I had in conducting research using these instruments.

2.2.1 Sampling method:

I choose the Manzini branch for its accessibility and the fact that it is a branch in my ward and the fact that I had previously for my honour project done research in the ward. I must clarify that I am not a member of this branch. It was easy for me to attend branch meetings and also some BEC meetings which the branch secretary and the chairperson had allowed me entry. I focused on one branch because I wanted to have an in-depth understanding of the role of the branch and how it relates to the municipality. Time constraints and the scope of this research paper are also some of the factors that had influence in me looking at only one branch of the ANC.

My key participants were ANC Branch Executive Committee (BEC), especially the chairperson and the secretary of the branch; I also interviewed some of the BEC members in trying to answer my research question. I also conducted in-depth interviews with ordinary ANC members; I used snowball sampling to select them (ordinary ANC members). As Bless (1996) notes, snowball sampling is used in research when the researcher cannot identify before hand, participants who fall in the categories he or she wants to research. The reason why I choose snowball sampling is because I did not know all the ANC members, so I relied

on some of the ANC members that I knew to refer me on to other ANC members. I also wanted to interview ANC members who work for the municipality to find out how they relate with their branches, but due to time constraints, this proved difficult. I had also hoped to interview the speaker of the municipal council and the ANC chief-whip to explore their understandings of the role of the branch in relation to the council, but after numerous failed attempts to secure an interview with them, I was forced to give up. “*Snowball sampling* is used to target difficult-to-reach people (members of religious sects or illegal migrants) by asking of them to direct the researcher to others of the same group” (Greenstein, 2003: 27). I also used snowball sampling to track down the municipal officials, asking the first officials that I interviewed first to refer me to others whom they thought might be able and willing to shed light on my quest to understand the relationship between the branch and the municipality and they did.

Initially I recorded my interviews, but I abandoned this because what would happen was that participants, when the recorder was on, would narrate the role of the ANC branch as stipulated in the constitution of the organization. However, when I switched it off, and was having my last words with them, the real interview would start and they would say what the branch does in reality and state their frustrations with the branch and its leadership. I then decided to have informal interviews with participants where I would not record but would say that I wanted us to talk about the role of the ANC branch and that it was for my masters thesis. The information that I obtained in such informal discussion was impressive as is going to be detailed below. All in all 33 recorded and informal interviews or discussions were done with all the categories of participants.

2.2.2 Overall Approach:

The research strategy that was used in this research was qualitative. As noted by Strauss and Corbin (1990) “[q]ualitative methods can be used to uncover and understand what lies behind any phenomenon about which little is yet known” (1990: 19). Bryman (2004) notes that a qualitative research strategy emphasizes words rather than quantification in data collection and analysis. In this research I relied more on what people said and did not focus much on statistical data. Qualitative research also helps in providing rich and contextual perspective on

issues which standardized questionnaires cannot provide (Greenstein: 2003). The rich and contextual perspective on issues that qualitative research gives is another reason why this research opted for qualitative than quantitative research. Greenstein (2003) also argues that qualitative research design helps in describing, understanding and explaining human behaviour. Qualitative research therefore seemed appropriate for seeking to explain, describe and understand how the ANC branch functions in reality and how it relates to local government, especially in ANC led municipalities.

2.2.3 Data Collection:

I went to ANC branch meetings and BEC's meetings as an observer, in order to understand the role of the ANC branch in reality and how it really functions. I used a note pad to take field notes in these meetings and then I wrote detailed field notes when I got home after the meetings. I obtained written permission from the branch secretary and the chairperson to conduct my research in their branch.

I used in-depth semi-structured interviews when I interviewed my participants. Greenstein (2003) notes in-depth-semi structured interviews involve a clear list of issues that need to be addressed and questions that need to be answered by the participants. In-depth semi-structured interviews also includes some level of flexibility in the sequence in which questions are answered and asked, while the research also allows the participant to speak more broadly on the topic or issues being discussed (Greenstein: 2003). The interview then becomes more of a conversation but one that has direction and the researcher is the one that guides the conversation. I used in-depth interviews because I wanted them to take a form of conversation in which the participants felt free to express themselves and also to allow me to probe more when new issues arose in the interview that helped me to answer my research question. "Interviews that sacrifice uniformity of questions to achieve fuller development of information are properly called qualitative interviews..." (Weiss, 1995: 3). Thus, I had themes of the issues that I wanted to explore in each interview. I did not have uniform questions that I asked in the same order so as to develop a fuller understanding. The unstructured, informal discussions that I had proved valuable, as the information that came from them was rich, as will be made evident in the report below.

I also used document analysis or evaluation as another data gathering method. I looked at the ANC's constitutions from its inception in 1912 to date in trying to understand the formal or official role of the branch from the party's perspective. This helped me in formulating my hypothesis, on what I had to look for in my study, to prove or disprove what the party says of the branches. This helped me in making sure that I do not go to the field as a blank slate, but that I had some theory upon which I based my observation. As Burawoy (1998) notes, our observations, that is if one employs ethnography or participant observation, are informed by some theory which then guides our observation.

I also looked at the ANC secretary generals' organizational reports, which are delivered at national conferences every five years to give the state of the organization. This report helped me to know some of the problems and successes of the branches and also helped me in formulating my hypothesis before going to the field.

2.2.4 Ethics appraisal:

"A researcher learns intimate knowledge from the field that is given in confidence. She has a moral obligation to uphold the confidentiality of data. This includes keeping information confidential from others in the field and disguising members' names in field notes" (Neuman 1994: 363). To maintain confidentiality of my participants, I gave them an information sheet which detailed what my research was about and also ensure them that what they told me would remain confidential and that none but my supervisor will have access to the interviews. I also provided them with a consent form for them to sign which indicated that their participation was voluntary and that they could stop the interview at any time when they felt uncomfortable and that there was no financial gain from participating in the study and that it was for an academic purpose. In my research field notes I used pseudonyms to guarantee my participants' anonymity in case they got lost. To maintain their confidentiality I will not quote their name in this research report, but will use pseudo names for them as topics of discussion often involved a highly political and controversial dimension (e.g. Exposure of incompetent or corrupt branch members and ANC officials). I am prepared to make a presentation to the branch at the conclusion of the research if they so desire.

Chapter 3: Decision making and Democracy in the ANC

3.1 Introduction

“The branch is the basic unit of the African National Congress (ANC). It is the principal agency for the political activity by ANC members and is the ‘primary vehicle for the maintaining and enhancing the mass character of our movement’. A person cannot join the ANC except through the branch and ninety per cent of delegates to the national conference, held every five years, and the organisations highest decision-making body, must come directly from branches. Branches are also ‘the place where members exercise their basic democratic right and formulate policy’. In fact, branches have always been a feature of the ANC. The 1919 ANC constitution, first adopted in 1914, lists the following as key to the organisation of the ANC: ‘Provincial congresses, district and local branches, agricultural and educational societies and industrial and economic unions’. The societies, unions and district branches have disappeared from the ANC constitution and only local branches remain today as the foundational structure of the organisation” (Dlamini, 2010: 1).

The branch as the basic unit of the organisation has attained much precedence since the election of Jacob Zuma. Many have attributed his election to the throne of the party to the branches and with the help of the alliance structures, SACP and Cosatu. This chapter tries to understand the branch, and most importantly, the democratic nature of the branch. How does the branch affect or influence decisions that are made in the ANC and how democratic is the branch? These are some of the questions that this chapter will try to explore.

The organisational structure of the ANC as noted in the organisation’s constitution is that it consists of: “The National Conference which elects the National Executive Committee (NEC). The Provincial Conference which elects the Provincial Executive Committee (PEC). The Regional Conference which elects the Regional Executive Committee (REC). The Branch Bi-annual General Meeting which elects the Branch Executive Committee (BEC)” (ANC constitution: 2007). What is of significance in the formal structure of the ANC, is that the National Executive Committee (NEC) which is the organisations’ highest decision-making body, is elected by normal members of the branch in the National conference. The

NEC as noted in the ANC constitution “ is the highest organ of the ANC between National Conferences and has the authority to lead the organisation, subject to the provisions of this constitution” (ANC Constitution: 2007). Ninety per cent of the delegates that attend the national conference that elects the NEC are from branches. The branches also make up 90 percent of the delegates in provincial and regional congresses and the National General Council (NGC) as well as policy conferences of the ANC. This chapter will try to look at how the formal structures of the ANC coincide with the real structure of the ANC, especially by focusing on the branch which has been regarded as the ‘*basic unit*’ of the organisation. How does the branch looks in reality?

The branch is described by formal documents of the ANC, including its constitution as: “the basic unit of the organisation” and stipulates that [e]very member of the ANC shall belong to a branch. The branch will be the place where members exercise their basic democratic rights to discuss and formulate policy. It must be registered with the PEC and have a minimum of 100 members, provided that the PEC may confer special recognition, where due to exceptional circumstances, the branch has fewer than 100 members” (ANC Constitution: 2007). Gwede Mantashe Secretary General (SG) of the ANC in his organisational report at the 2010 NGC argued that branches “are there primary organs of the ANC to which every member, including the leadership, must belong. They (branches) are the umbilical cord of the ANC and communities, and the primary political school for the socialisation of ANC members” (State of the Organisation Report NGC: 2010). The branch of the ANC is seen by the organisation as a place where ANC members participate and shape the life of the organisation and is a place where they experience and exercise their democratic right which is dear to the ANC.

“The strategic location of the branch in the midst of the communities and its closeness to the people makes it the bedrock on which all the mass work of the ANC and internal decision making of the movement rests” (Kgalema Motlanthe, Organisation Report: 2007). The branch which is located in the communities where people live, argues the ANC’s constitution, is where members will exercise their democratic right to discuss and formulate policies. But with all the emphasis on, and the significance of, the branch in the life of the

ANC, the ANC itself notes that there are some challenges faced by branches which affect the organisation.

Mantashe warns that even if “[a]ll the structures may appear in good shape and theoretically strong, but (sic) if there are no branches, or branches are weak, there is no organisation, as there can be no organisational life. No campaign can be sustained if the branches are weak” (NGC, State of the Organisation Report: 2010). The branches of the ANC are the life of the organisation as Mantashe notes that organisational life of the ANC can only be sustained by branches. Branches are of major significance because all campaigns of the ANC have to occur in this local sphere of the organisation. This also raises the question of the actual role of the branch: is it about campaigning for the ANC, or where members can exercise their democratic right?

The challenges facing the branches, notes then Secretary General (SG) of the ANC Kgalema Motlanthe in his organisational report, at what many have termed the ‘historic conference’ in Polokwane, is that in branches, only a few participate in carrying out the responsibility of building the branch, while the rest of the membership remain passive. Michels (1958) notes that the passive members allow leaders to dominate, leading to the demise of democracy in the party, in this case the branch.

Kgalema Motlanthe notes that some of the challenges or problems facing branches include the following: “[o]nly a few active members carry the entire responsibility of building the branch, with the rest of the membership remaining passive. The disconnection between the ANC members and the branch organisation, and the absence of strong political consciousness amongst members. Lack of adequate financial and administrative resources to run ongoing campaigns and manage the day-to-day affairs of the branch. The challenges that arise inevitably from organising in the poorest and most marginalized sections of our community, including the challenge of access to resources. In some wards, especially in rural areas, the large size of the branch area makes convening regular meetings difficult. Disunity, lack of cohesion and sectarian practices amongst branch leadership stifles the realisation of the ideal branch organisation in many instances. A lethargic attitudes amongst some NEC and PEC

members to the tasks of mass work and building branches” (SG Organisational Report, 2007). He also noted that these are the problems that limit the functioning of the branch as the basic unit of the organisation. Jacob Dlamini (2010) notes that “the ANC’s Polokwane conference has gone down in history as a prime example of the tsunami-like power of branches and ‘ordinary’ ANC members to sweep away the leadership of the ANC” (p2) but also asks a question: “[how] can branches be so dysfunctional and still be central to the biggest events in recent ANC history” (Ibid). Adding to that question would be how to explain the significance of the branch, if it is so dysfunctional, and yet central to the ANC?

3.2 Tales of ANC meetings

With much emphasis placed on the ANC branch, I decided that one of my research instruments should be being a non-participant observer in ANC general membership meetings and BEC meetings, in order to understand some of the issues that were covered and discussed, and how they influence decision making in the ANC as a whole. What I uncovered was that meetings are not well attended. Interestingly, even the leadership meeting, BEC meetings, were not well attended by the leadership of the branch. This led me to ask the question ‘why was this the case?’ Was it because there were no substantial issues that were discussed in these meetings or was there any other reason why there was poor attendance? Is the branch really the basic unit of the organisation where policies are formulated and implemented? These are some of the questions I had in mind going to these meetings.

3.2.1 Branch Manipulation and Internal Democracy within the ANC branch

One respondent, Dumisane, argued that the reason why people did not attend these meetings was because the branch is seen as belonging to certain people, especially the secretary, who has the power to decide when the branch has meetings, and who is contacted to come to such meetings. Dumisane also noted that branches were manipulated by some BEC members especially those who want leadership positions in the party. He argued that the fact that branches have the power to elect leaders into positions, and have 90 per cent voting power in elective conferences, results in ambitious individuals coming to branch meetings or branches and manipulating them through BEC members.

“They manipulate branches because they want positions...because the branches are significant and if you want any leadership position in the ANC they will tell you that ‘start at the branch first’. Because you can’t say that you want to go to PEC (Provincial Executive Committee) who will put you there?, ofaka ngubani? (who will put you there?), the only thing to do is to get people who will vote for you and you can only find them in branches” (Dumisane. Interview:7/7/2010). What this participant noted was the significance of the branch in the election of the leaders of the party, and the fact that leaders come to the branches when they want to lobby votes for themselves or for particular leaders. Thus many argued that the Zuma victory in Polokwane in 2007 was due to branches. The disgruntled cadres who were sidelined by Thabo Mbeki mobilised branches to vote for Zuma. Of significance here, is the internal democracy within the ANC and the bottom-up approach to democracy vs. the top-down approach.

“Just like a child, it can’t just walk it must first start by crawling before walking, thus we say that the ‘branch is the most basic unit in the ANC’. For everyone to lead the ANC one has to start at the branch, lead your branch first, even [Jacob] Zuma is a member of a branch” (Mbuso. Interview: 18/07/2010). Branches in this light are spaces where party leadership is groomed. Thus this participant used the analogy of a child referring to the branch, when referring to its role in the ANC when it comes to building future leaders of the party. Even the ANC constitution notes that every member of the organisation, including leaders of the party, must belong to a branch. Using the child analogy offered by this participant means that that branches serve as the space in which leaders are nurtured in the ANC, preparing them to participate in the upper structures of the party. This means that the party uses branches for preparing leaders. Thus the branch can be seen by members with leadership ambitions as spaces which train them to lead the party at regional, provincial and even at national level. Thus they manipulate branches so that they are voted to lead the party at the branch which will eventually lead to higher posts in the party. The branch is used for upward mobility by local leaders, which in turn undermines the democratic nature of the branch and the party, because these leaders will colonise and manipulate democratic processes to suit their leadership ambitions. Thus individuals who want leadership positions must start at branch level and lobby support through leaders of the BEC. They use the leaders of the branch to manipulate outcomes of Branch General Meetings (BGMs). This is possible, as I have alluded to earlier, as the lack of attendance at meetings give these leaders space to manipulate

the membership list which is crucial to the launching of branches and for BGMs to take place. Because of the fact that branches have the majority voting power in elective congresses, 90 per cent of the voters in these congresses come from branches. Thus they end up being manipulated.

The fact that branches are manipulated by certain cadres of the ANC to favour certain leaders clearly shows that democracy is undermined by these elective processes. One participant, Dumisane, responded to a question I asked to try to understand how branches are manipulated, as follows: he argued that people who have leadership ambitions pay money to certain BEC leaders in branches. These are the people who recruit their friends to manipulate membership lists. The manipulation of the membership list offers BEC leaders a chance to influence the outcomes of BGMs because they have members who will vote in their favour, as they tell these members who they should vote for. “Reports of ‘gate-keeping’, ‘ghost members’, ‘commercialisation of membership’, ‘rent-a-member’ and other forms of fraudulent and manipulative practices that seek to influence the outcomes of elective process remain much too widespread” (Kgalema Motlanthe, Organisation Report: 2007). Gugu, who was one of my participants, noted that some people join the ANC branch because their membership has been paid for by someone who then instruct them on who they should vote for in the leadership of the branch, which is termed ‘rent-a-member’. Thus meetings that are well attended and form a quorum, are those that elect leaders, which are BGMs, and those that nominate who should represent the ANC as a councillor in Local Government election. Meetings that talk about organisational issues are not well attended. Michels (1958) would in turn argue that the reason why people arrive in large numbers for BGMs which elect the leadership of the branch, is because they want leaders to make decision on their behalf.

3.2.2 *Factions: “Camps” - ‘Members-of-members’*

“You have people who says ANC members are their people, ‘bantfu bami’ (my people), there is nothing like that, we are all ANC members. And because such people then have differences in the branch, when we have to launch (the branch) he will tell ‘his people’ not to come to the BGM so that the branch doesn’t form a quorum and it would not launch” (Dumisane. Interview: 18/07/2010). ‘Members-of-members’ is what some participants called this phenomenon of branch members referring to some members of the organisation as their

members. This is what has led to the camps. Some members of the party deny their existence in the province, arguing that the conferences' results are final and that every member accepts them. But it is documented that this is not the case. Those who have written about the emergence of Congress of the People (COPE) post-Polokwane have argued that it emerged as a result of ANC members being unable to accept that the ANC was going to be led by Jacob Zuma whom they had never imagined could ascend to the top post of the organisation. "For Pallo Jordan, who disagreed with the decision to remove Mbeki, COPE is little more than a vehicle of those who have lost power, patronage and resources" (Southall, 2010: 330). This could help to explain the camps within the ANC, and why people want to win branches and even buy membership for some people in the branch. Being a leader of the party opens opportunities to access state resources and patronage. This is also influenced by the blurring of the state and the party, which I will explore later.

"Instability within the ANC will therefore be from financial rather than ideological motivations, as marginal groups see government as a vehicle to gain easy access to state finance" (Southall, 2010: 327). The fact that government for many ANC members is seen as their property or as part of the party and that being an ANC leader equates to being a public official or holding a government job is another factor that has led to the feud over leadership in the party. This patronage network which has been endemic in the ANC will be detailed later on in the thesis in chapter 5. Of significance here is that these leadership disputes and the blurring of the line between the state and the ANC, has led to many leadership contests which are not about ideological differences but are about party positions which promises opportunities to amass state resources.

These battles have created camps within the ANC which are about supporting candidates for leadership position which will unleash patronage to their supporters immediately after they attain power and have access to state resources. "When we join these camps we have to know how it is going to benefit us, we cannot just join a camp without any reward. We cannot struggle and lobby for comrades only to advance their lives" (Jabu. Interview, 20/07/2010). What this participant, Jabu, argued, was that the high levels of unemployment in the ward and in the branch, fuels these camps. People, especially the leadership or those individuals who have leadership ambitions, know they can easily manipulate branches by promising people on

the ground that they will offer them employment if they are elected. Thus he argued that money is pumped into these branches to support camps. Even those who want to be ward councillors promise people jobs in the municipality in exchange for their votes.

“The money is the one that is making these comrades crazy because they (BEC) are given money and told what they have to do in the branch. They take the money and do as they are told...they then buy comrades alcohol and they win branches for certain camps” (Jabu. Interview: 20/07/2010). Money is used to win branches, which is what some participants have termed it ‘dirty-lobbying’. The ANC is against this, because it means that those who have money stand a better chance of leading the organisation, regardless of their leadership capability and qualities, over those who do not have money. Another participants argued that camps do not only exist at national level, but start at the branch level, especially among those who want to be councillors or leaders of the party in the branch.

What is actually happening in this branch, I would argue, is that members, even though they see the need for leadership, do not join the ANC voluntary. Their membership is bought by individuals who want their vote. Members become *members-of- members*. This clearly shows that there is commodification of the branch. Thus the ANC itself notes this tendency results in branches being revitalised before elective congresses and then dying afterwards, which will be explored in detail in chapter 4. As Kgalema Motlanthe notes “[t]he number of branches in all our provinces grew towards the 1997 Conference and continued upward, seemingly related to vigorous recruiting efforts in preparation for Provincial conferences in 1998. This membership declined immediately after the provincial conferences, and grew again as regions prepared for their own conferences and the 1999 elections.” (Kgalema Motlanthe, Organisation Report: 2002). This could be attributed to what Dumisane argued about the manipulations of branches, “... people want to win branches and regions because if they do they take a substantial number of delegates to PEC, REC and even National Conferences to vote for them” (Dumisane. Interview: 07/07/2010).

This could explain why general meetings of the ANC did not form a quorum in this branch, which led to its disbandment by the region, because branches are used for upward mobility by

leaders of the party. Thus, on 29 July 2010 after several attempts by the BEC to convene a BGM the branch was disbanded by the region because it had failed to launch, because meetings that were meant to be BGM could not form a quorum. “The quorum for each meeting of the annual branch meeting and any other branch meeting where the branch makes nominations of candidates for elections within the ANC or for public representation or takes decisions relating to policy matters, shall be 50% plus one of the total paid-up members of the branch” (ANC Constitution: 2007). The branch had failed according to this stipulation to hold their BGM which then left the region with no choice but to disband the branch. Some questioned the power that the region has when it comes to the functioning of branches and most importantly the power to disband a branch. The ANC Constitution argues that “[t]he regional executive committee (REC) shall be accountable to the PEC (Provincial Executive Committee) for its functioning. The powers of the regional executive committee are such powers as are delegated to it by the PEC. In addition, the REC may, subject to the directions and instructions of the PEC, exercise the following powers: Supervise and direct the work of the ANC and all its organs in the region, including the ANC local government caucuses. Recommend to the PEC the suspension (sic) or dissolution of a BEC, Zonal Committee or Sun-Region Committees” (ANC Constitution: 2007). One member of the disbanded BEC alluded to the fact that the region or REC does not have the power to disband branches. Instead they can only recommend the disbandment of the branch to the PEC which has the power to disband branches. He argued that the branch was disbanded as the region wanted to control or manipulate the branch, by putting in their own people who they can control.

What I can say about the events leading up to the disbandment of the branch is that people were reluctant to participate in its functioning and did not attend general meetings. According to the Constitution of the ANC, branches must have at least one meeting per month and the BEC must meet at least once per fortnight. But this was not happening at this branch. A BEC member, Mduduzi, argued that “it is useless to call these meetings if we don’t even form a quorum. We end up having to have caucuses which do not make any change in the life of the branch and you cannot make any decisions in such meetings” (Mduduzi. Interview: 7/07/2010). I also observed this in meetings that I attended. There would be a few members and some informal discussion on broader ANC issues. The meeting would turn into a gathering of cadres discussing what is happening in the ANC and the country without actually discussing issues that affect the branch and how the branch can contribute to the life

of the party. This also applied to BEC meetings, which only a few members attended. Of all the BEC meetings I attended for my fieldwork, none had the full BEC membership present. Thus I wrote in my field notes ‘how can the general members of the branch attend these meeting if the leadership of the branch themselves fail to attend their own meeting? Is this because there is no value in these meeting or members are just lazy to participate in this structure because it fails to yield an outcomes. How would Michels explain the lack of participation from the leaders? If leaders tend to dominate the party why, in this branch, would the very same leaders who are meant to dominate the party not attend party meetings which will offer them the opportunity to dominate party processes?’ (Field notes 7/07/2010). These questions directed my fieldwork to try to understand why the same faces continuously attended these meetings even though they did not form a quorum. This I will detail later on in the chapter and chapter 5 when I discuss the patronage networks that are opened by the ANC branch.

The disbandment of the branch showed how the local elite or the BEC members had no interest in the life of the branch, and how they had lost their grip on organising the branch and their popularity amongst members of the branch. As one participant, Dumisane, noted the branch had become isolated from the masses and the chairperson and secretary of the BEC had colonised the branch. Thus the regional secretary argued that the reason for disbanding the branch was the fact that: “the centre doesn’t hold any more, it seems like the BEC is divided and cannot work together to convene a BGM that will launch the branch” (ANC Meeting: 29/08/2010). These were the words of the regional deployee who had come to oversee the BGM in the branch and decided that the branch must be disbanded, after the branch failed to form a quorum, which in this case was suppose to be 50 per cent plus one of the 217 members of the branch.

Thus the branch had to be disbanded because members had lost faith in the BEC and a new BEC had to be elected. A Branch Task Team (BTT) was elected. The forming of the BTT and the disbandment of the branch, many argued, was because some of the 217 members who were on the register for the branch were bought, and some were ghost members. One argued that ghost members are created by the fact that the more members you have in your branch the more delegates you send to elective congresses. Thus when these congresses occur,

leadership of the branch, especially the secretary, manipulate the register and create ghost members which then allow them to send more delegates to these congresses.

The disbandment of the branch was met with much criticism from the BEC members, some arguing that the branch can only be disbanded by its members if they feel that the BEC is no longer functional, and not the region. They argued that the regional deployee was only there to facilitate the process and to make sure that it is not manipulated. The disbandment of the branch can help us to understand the powers that upper structures have over the functioning of the lower ones. A regional deployee disbanded the branch without the consent of the membership, because it had failed to launch in the time frame that it was given. And because the BEC had failed to organise a BGM which could form a quorum, clearly shows that the region has power to undermine the democratic principle that is dear to the ANC. There was an outcry by some members that the branch was disbanded because it did not support the dominant camp in the province, which is the DD Mabuza camp, who is the Provincial Chairperson of the ANC and Premier of the Province (Mpumalanga), a Zuma loyalist. The region was in a campaign to disband all branches like this one and put them in the hands of those who supported the dominant camp in the province, many argued.

These reasons why the branch was disbanded might have some elements of truth because the leadership of the province needs branches to maintain their power. They can only do so if they have a substantial number of branches. “Zuma is where he is because of the branch, Zuma on his own can’t be the president. He must be elected or voted by branches, even the PEC must be elected by branches. They don’t elect each other because they have positions. They are voted for by us (branches) but at the end of the day they fail to work for us...thus you see people wanting to win branches because if they have more people in the branch the more delegates they have in conferences. Thus they pump money into these branches to have more people so that they have more delegates to vote for them” (Dumisane. Interview: 7/7/2010). Internal democracy within the ANC is undermined or compromised by these elements that are used by leaders to retain or acquire leadership positions in the organisation, which others have argued, leads to access to state resources. Branches are then used not as the sphere of the organisation where members can realise their democratic right and formulate

policies, but instead are seen by leaders as spaces that can be used to maintain or get into positions in the organisation.

On 12 September 2010 the branch, under the leadership of the ward councillor who was also assigned as the convenor of the BTT which was mandated on the 29th of August 2010 to ensure that the branch launched within two weeks, was now ready to launch and managed to form a quorum. This meeting was the test of internal democracy for it was to elect the new leadership of the branch, the BEC. Many had argued that the region was going to put or nominate people who would support the dominant camp in the province. I asked “how so?” as the people who were going to vote in the BGM were branch members and not regional members. One suggested that I must come to observe what will happen in the BGM, noting that certain people are going to be given a list with the names of the people and the position that they must be voted for in the BEC. These people that are going to be given these lists did not pay their membership fees, but were paid by those people who will be giving out these lists. The 12th of September came, and yes, lists were given out to some members who had come to the meeting. As the election process unfolded, the list that I also managed to get, was confirmed by the members. As the election process unfolded and the list was confirmed, some members of the party left the meeting while the election process was still underway, arguing that this meeting was not democratic and that it was a confirmation of the lists that was given to some members. One of the members who was giving out these lists, argued, when some members said that he should stop handing them out: “I am lobbying for my comrades, it is allowed in the ANC, lobby for your comrades no one is stopping you”. This brings the notion of lobbying to the fore, and how it should be done.

3.3.3 Lobbying - “Is it about democracy or does it undermine democracy?”

“The ANC democracy allows you to influence me and also allows me to influence you as well...but the problem now is that the membership that you saw in the BGM was a membership that had been bought membership cards by some individuals who wanted their vote. These people were then given a list on who should be the chairperson, deputy chairperson, secretary and so forth. Which then undermines democracy, this is dirty lobbying, as people do not apply their minds, they just do as their told” (Benedict. Interview: 18/09/2010).

“How should people apply their minds?”, I asked. He replied that people apply their minds only when they do not expect to benefit from the election process and that they do not owe anyone, “people only apply their minds when they have nothing to lose” (Ibid) . Benedict said that the fact that these people have been bought membership cards, means that they would have to pay something back in return to their funders, and that is their vote in the election process. “The Stellenbosch Conference in 2002, in the context of weak branches structures and even weak cadre development programmes, also raised concerns about members and branches being used as ‘voting cattle’ in the leadership battles, and the tendency to have recruitment and active structures mainly for the purposes of elective conferences, in the absence of consistent programmes to organise and mobilise the local communities and the motive forces” (Febe Potgieter-Gqubule: 2010). What unfolded in the BGM was exactly what the Conference warned its members about, where members are used by leaders as ‘voting cattle’. Elite democracy theorists like Michels (1958) would argue that this is what the masses become once the party has been colonised by the elite. They become mere voters who do not participate in the life and the day-to-day running of the party, but only when they have to elect leaders of the party. Others would argue in turn that leaders have the right to influence other members and lobby for votes and that is part of the democratic process. That granted, to what extent does lobbying allow or open space for democracy?

Lobbying is allowed in the ANC as Febe Potgieter-Gqubule (2010) notes: “ANC constitutions and organisational rules gave [gives] any member the right to nominate, stand for elections and to be voted for. This process by its very nature meant contest among individuals and lobbying by their supporters” (Potgieter-Gqubule: 2010). She also notes that the lobbying processes and leadership contests are not something new in the party, but have always been part of the ANC tradition, noting some historical leadership contests in the party. The lobbying process allows members to be influenced and to influence others in turn, but what I observed in this particular BGM was how the process undermines the democratic process and the independence of the voters. As one participant argued, democracy was undermined in the branch because of the fact that some members’ cards are funded by certain individuals, who then instruct them on how they should vote in BGMs. He also noted that some are even given lists with the people that they should vote for in these meetings. These individuals (funders) are also present in these meetings to make sure that ‘their members’

vote for the people on the list, arguing that democracy could only be maintained in the branch if a secret ballot system was used compared to the show of hands which is currently used. The fact that the lobbying in the BGM was influenced by members who had been bought membership, as some argued, means that democracy is undermined, by the very fact that the lobbying process involved money.

One former BEC member, Sabelo, argued that this is ‘dirty lobbying’, because it was lobbying that involves money. He noted that in the past, before 1990, when the ANC was banned, being in the ANC BEC was not contested as it is now. He argued that, yes, the ANC was banned, but they still organised in communities and branches. He notes that to be an organiser of the branch you were asked to stand or to organise in your community and if you agreed you knew that your life was in danger because the police would hunt you down. He argued that today, the contest for leadership in the ANC branch was because “people want to loot the state” (Sabelo, Interview: 18/09/2010). The reason for the leadership contests in branches, argues this participant, Sabelo, is due to the fact that many sees ANC positions as stepping stones to positions of power in municipalities and government departments. Thus, one argued that every chairperson of an ANC branch is either a government employee or businessman who will benefit from tendering processes. Even though this is a weak generalisation, it has something to say about the ANC that people have since come to know, and what it means to be in the leadership of the organisation. Thus Febe Potgieter-Gqubule (2010) notes that leadership of the ANC has noticed the leadership contest in ANC structures “with growing concerns that the intensity and decisiveness of the contests reflect[ed] the fact that leadership positions in the ANC [are] being seen as stepping stones to positions in material reward in government” (Potgieter-Gqubule: 2010). Thus this thesis will later highlight some of the reasons why people join ANC branches and what is in it for ANC card carrying-members. Do people join the ANC branch because they want some material gains, or because they want to advance the causes that the party is promoting, and to influence policies of the party? These are some of the issues that will be explored in chapter 5 when we discuss patronage networks through the branches.

Some authors have argued that the blurring of the State and the ANC is one that has led to the fierce leadership contest which led to the ousting of Mbeki by those who felt sidelined by his

government and tenure as the president of the ANC. ANC members have come to equate position in the ANC with a government job and access to state resource. Thus branches are terrains of contest with those who want positions of power pumping money into branches to manipulate the outcomes of democratic processes in the branch, especially BGMs. This then raises questions of whether the branch is really the ‘basic unit of the organisation’?, if they are manipulated.

“When you talk about ANC you are talking about government and you can’t separate the running of the municipality and the ANC, it [ANC] is government” (Mr Mabena. Interview: 18/10/2010). These were the word of one municipal official which shows that there is a blurring of the line between the state or municipality, and the ANC. The lack of distinction between the state and party was also reprised by a BEC member: “if we speak about governments now we are speaking about the ANC” (Stalin. Interview: 7/08/2010). Thus people then want to get into positions in the party, for that will lead to them getting access to the state or the municipality.

With all the shortcomings and challenges that are faced by the branch, one participant argued that the branch in actual fact has some influence in decision making of the ANC. Arguing that he joined the ANC because: “[t]he decisions that the ANC has to make must come from branches, this is the reason that made me to join the branch because I did not want to say ‘I love the ANC’ and while not a full card carrying member, because if you don’t join it means that you won’t be able to influence decisions” (Zanele. Interview. 29/08/2010). Even though in the meetings that I attended no policy issues were discussed, she argued that the decision by the ANC to ban government or municipal officials for standing as councillors, came from the branches. She argued that there was an outcry from branches that government employees and municipal officials fail to serve their communities because they are doing two demanding jobs, and the ward or their communities are compromised. This, she argued, explains the call by Jacob Zuma to all councillors, and those who have ambitions to be councillors, to decide whether they want to be politicians or bureaucrats. In this regard one can see that even though branches are used for instrumental reasons by leaders, there are some gains that come out of these structures. Thus some people, such as this participant, see a reason why they should participate in branches.

“You must not only participate in the ANC when it is election time, but one must be a full member to influence decision and policies of the ANC. Because the branch is the ‘*basic unit of the organisation*’, every decision that the ANC makes starts from the branch” (Zanele. Interview: 29/08/2010). Zanele was optimistic about the role of the branch and its significance in the ANC. She reiterated that the branch was where they influenced policies of the ANC, and that for one to shape any decision that is made by the party, it is important to belong to a branch. As I have highlighted above, in all the meetings that I attended, no policy issues were discussed. The most important thing that was discussed was that the branch must re-launch, because they wanted to have a structure of the organisation in the ward. Because as one said of the dangers of having a BTT, was that the region would then run the affairs of the branch; decisions would be made by the region for the branch as there would be no formal BEC. He argued that would have negative implications in the process of nominating the ward councillor, which would undermine the power of the members of the branch.

Meetings that followed after the branch had launched all focussed on the nomination of candidates to stand as the ANC councillor in the 2011 local government elections. The meetings were characterised by emotions running high, and battles, as there were different camps, even though this term is contested, but the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) and the ANC Woman’s League (ANCWL) and the ‘mother body’, the main ANC as they call it, all had their preferred candidates that they forwarded to contest the councillorship nomination. In this meeting, democracy prevailed, as all the members of the ANC were given an opportunity to nominate their candidates. “Everyone is going to nominate who they want as the ANC councillor and no one is going to go out here and say ‘I did not nominate’, everyone is going to nominate whether we have 50 candidates that is fine the community will decide who they want” the regional representative assured members (ANC Meeting: 7/01/2011). This raises the question of whether democracy is about voting, or does it go beyond voting? Initially, members were sceptical about electing the chairperson of the BEC, because, they argued, if they elected a wrong candidate who belongs to the dominant camp in the province, it would have negative implications for the nomination of the ANC candidate for the 2011 Local Government elections. They thought that she/he would identify certain individuals to nominate, and not some which he or she thought would nominate a candidate which s/he did

not like. The fact that the regional representative of the party chaired the meeting was a relief for some. However, others, were sceptical, arguing that he had an agenda, coming to the branch where he was going to put his candidate, which they argued, had already been decided by the region.

The regional representative of the ANC really did what he had promised. Everyone was given a chance to nominate a person that they thought was suitable to represent the party in the upcoming Local Government elections. Some members were nominated but declined their nomination; and finally there were 5 nominees who accepted. Of approximately twenty-one nominations, the majority declined, most citing no reason for this. These candidates were to go through a screening process by the branch screening committee, elected by the branch, which was to look at their credentials, including their membership record, criminal records and other moral issues. I argued that the fact that the branch was given an opportunity to nominate their own candidates is not in fact how democracy should work. The masses or the members only see their power when they elect leaders, but they should also constantly engage in the life of the organisation by participating in decision making processes. Even though some authors have argued that this is not possible, at the branch level where there is a small number of people, in this case 217 members, democracy can be realised if members are included in the life of the branch, and not only left to the BEC.

The screening committee has the power to decide on the two candidates after the processes have unfolded, including the community meeting. The community meeting is where the candidates are presented to the community, and the community endorses two of the candidates who are then taken to the region. The region will make the final decision on who should represent the ANC in that ward or branch. The fact that the region has the final say on who should represent the party in branches, also limits democracy in branches and the ANC. Why are branches not given the prerogative to choose who they want as an ANC candidate for the Local Government election? The branch as the 'basic unit of the organisation' is deprived of the power to decide on who should be its representative in the municipality, and an agent of service delivery, as ward councillors are meant to be. I argue that the power that is bestowed on the region undermines democracy in branches. BGMs, councillor nomination, and disbandment of branches are all powers and processes that are facilitated by the region.

3.4 Conclusion

The branch as the 'basic unit' of the ANC has been affected by some tendencies which the ANC itself has noticed and some have called them 'foreign tendencies'. These include the rent-a-member, where members are bought membership cards of the party and they only come to elective meetings to vote for the people that bought them their membership. Commercialisation of branches is another, which is when a branch is bought by those leaders who want senior positions in the party. This is done through BEC members who are given money to manipulate the outcome of BGMs and delegates' nomination processes. The branch can then vote them into upper structures of the party. Because branches' delegates make up ninety per cent of the voting delegates in elective conferences, they are thus manipulated. This manipulation of branches then leads to camps, which are about leadership contestation, and include 'dirty' lobbying. Lobbying in the ANC is encouraged, but there is one type that has emerged recently, which includes money and resources. It is thus termed 'dirty' lobbying, as those people who lobby for certain candidates do so because they are paid or promised something, most of the times government jobs, because of the blurring of the line between state and party. Being a party leader means also being a government official or having access to state resources. In this light, democracy is undermined by these elements that emanate from the branch, and members of the ANC are deprived of their democratic right to participate in the life of the organisation without any influence.

Chapter 4: ANC, Electioneering and Mobilisation

4.1 Introduction

The ANC branch as the basic unit of the party is the sphere of the organisation where members discuss and formulate policies, and where they practice their democratic right, notes the ANC constitution (2007). This means that the branch is the umbilical cord of the ANC which carries the function of the party on the grass roots. One of the main functions that the party notes as the core function of the branch includes carrying out the mass work of the party. This includes mobilisation during elections, both national and local government elections, and also mobilising during elective congresses of the party. The ANC Constitution (2007) argues that as branches are in the midst of communities, they should help them with developmental issues. This then puts the branch at the centre of development in communities where they exist. This chapter tries to understand how the ANC branch functions on the ground, by largely focusing on its mobilisation function which theorists like Tordoff (1993) have cited as the most imported function of political parties.

Constitutionally, the branch of the ANC is meant to meet at least once per month, and the branch is meant to have bi-annual general meetings where it elects its leadership, the BEC. The BEC is in turn supposed to meet at least once per fortnight. The BEC should “[m]eet as soon as possible after is (sic) election and allocate tasks and functions amongst its members to enable it to carry out the day-to-day activities of the Branch. Carry out the publicity and organisational work in its area in furtherance of the policy, programme and decisions of the ANC...Submit reports on its work to the branch meeting and at least each month to the Regional Executive Committee” (ANC Constitution: 2007). With the formal function of the branch highlighted, it is important to look at the reality of what the branch really does in reality. As many have shown that there is a disjuncture between what the Constitution says, or what is on paper, or policies of the party, and what happens on the ground or in reality.

“The ANC’s leadership of society rests firmly upon our presence in all communities, and the ANC branch is the primary vehicle for maintaining the mass character of our movement. ANC branches are the basic unit of political activity for our members. Beyond adherence to the constitutional requirements, the strength and character of a branch must be measured against its role in mobilising community around issues of local transformation and development, and its capacity to remain in dynamic contact with communities in a state of constant mobilisation. The strategic location of the branch in the midst of communities and its closeness to the people makes it the bedrock on which all the mass work of the ANC and internal decision making of the movement rest” (Kgalema Motlanthe, Organisation Report: 2007).

The branch, in this light, is there to carry out the mass work of the ANC. This mass work is most evident when it has to mobilise for the party when elections come, in both general and local government elections, including party elections. This chapter will interrogate this notion that the branch is used to mobilise for the party, and also look at why branches die between elections and conferences, only to be revitalized in the run-up to elections and conferences. Is this because the branch is a mobilising tool for the ANC because of its strategic location in the midst of communities, or is it the sphere of the party where members get to participate in party life? The branch and its strategic location, in the midst of communities, is one of significance because it is able to carry-out the mass work of the organisation. As highlighted in the preceding chapter, there are some challenges that are faced by ANC branches, and they appear to be dysfunctional. At the same time, branches are argued to have been at the centre of the most dramatic moment of the party in recent history, the Polokwane Conference in 2007, which many have termed the watershed conference. It saw the ousting of Thabo Mbeki who many within the ANC and alliance partners felt sidelined by his autocratic leadership style. And was replaced by Jacob Zuma, who was seen as the man of the people. Is the centrality of the branch due to the fact that it was able to mobilise people to rally behind the incumbent president of the party, Jacob Zuma, or the fact that they make up ninety percent of the voting delegates in ANC elective conference, or are there some underlying factors that make the branch the basic unit of the party?

Kgalema Motlanthe, in his organisational report in the 2005 NGC, noted that at the party’s 51st National Conference which was held in Stellenbosch, it resolved that “the ANC branch

remains the primary vehicle for maintaining and enhancing the mass based character of the ANC and for the implementation of the campaigns and programmes of the ANC” (Kgalema Motlanthe, NGC Organisation Report: 2005). The Polokwane conference also reiterated in its resolution, that the branch remains the ‘basic unit’ of the party, and carrying out the mass character of the organisation by mobilising communities. But there are some challenges that are faced by branches or the ‘basic unit’ of the organisation. Motlanthe notes that even though the branches were supposed to be the sphere of the party which carry out the mass work of the organisation, branches still had some problems. These problems included the fact that there are “branches that are launched prior to conferences and election campaigns, only to collapse a few months later” (Kgalema Motlanthe, NGC Organisation Report: 2005). Is this because the branch is merely used for instrumental functions which include carrying out election campaigns and electing leaders? Tordoff (1993) argues that one of the most important roles of political parties is their mobilisation function, which helps the party to win elections and also to legitimise the party in elections that are declared free and fair, which then includes the legitimating function of political parties (Tordoff: 1993). Thus Butler (2009) notes one of the strategies that was employed by the ANC successfully in their election campaign was the door-to-door campaign which was carried out by their volunteers. One could ask is the mass work that the ANC speaks of in its constitution that which revolves around carrying out election campaigns, or is it about mobilising around developmental issues in the branch?

As highlighted by Motlanthe ANC branches only come to life just before elections and elective congresses. The Polokwane narrative offered by Jacob Dlamini (2010) tries to explain why many attribute Zuma’s ascendancy to the top seat in Luthuli House to branches, and poses a question as to why would branches be regarded as dysfunctional and yet central to the presidency of the incumbent. Dlamini (2009) in his final analysis argues that branches could not be the sole factor which secured Zuma a victory at Polokwane. As Southall (2009 & 2010) notes, the alliance structures, COSATU and SACP, played a huge role in making Zuma a victor in Polokwane. One might ask the question, why, if branches are central to the ANC, do they die between elections and elective congresses, only to be revived prior to these events? This is the question that this chapter will try to answer by looking at the mobilisation function of the branch and how it is carried out.

Gwede Mantashe, in his organisational report in the 2010 NGC, notes some of these tendencies in branches that Motlanthe highlighted then, arguing that “[m]embership growth has fluctuated since Polokwane, with large increase around some provincial conferences, often followed by declines. For example, in the Northern Cape membership rose shortly before the provincial Conference in September 2008 to 44 000, but declined to current levels – that is, 33 122...” (NGC organisational report: 2010). What could be said of branches is that they tend to die between conferences and only get revitalised before these, conferences, and elections. The question could be are branches used by the ANC for mobilisation purposes prior to elective conferences or during elections? Why the fluctuation in membership during these periods? This chapter will explore the role of the branch in carrying out this mass character of the organisation that the ANC constitutions alludes to. One might argue that the mass work of the organisation only comes during these periods when people have to campaign for the ANC during election time and also to lobby for certain leaders when elective conferences come.

“The ANC’s leadership of our society rests firmly on our presence in all communities. Our presence and outreach rests on branch structures and where these are non-existent it will be impossible for the ANC to play a meaningful role in the life of the community” (Kgalema Motlanthe, NGC Organisation Report: 2005). Branches as the basic unit of the movement are also the link of the ANC with the communities and their existence in communities helps the ANC to be in touch with the people. Motlanthe, in his organisational report at the 2005 NGC, noted that the most important thing about branches was that they help the organisation in mobilising for the party and recruiting members and carrying out campaigns of the party during election time. Thus in his 2007 organisational report he commended those who helped the ANC in mobilising in their branches. “In the election campaign of 2004 and 2006, hundreds of thousands of ANC members volunteered their time and energy towards the realisation of our overwhelming victory. These volunteers were drawn from the poor and the unemployed and were composed largely of woman and youth. Their selfless dedication to the movement, offered without the expectation of material advantage or personal gain is a shining example of the kind of service and loyalty upon which our organisation has been built over the last 95 years” (Kgalema Motlanthe, Organisation Report: 2007). The people that

helped the ANC to carry-out its election campaigns were from branches. Butler (2009: 9) notes that “[t]he ANC’s methods were once again dominated by door-to-door canvassing by volunteers, a traditional emphasis that the ANC secretary general Gwede Mantashe confirmed early on in the campaign”. The door-to-door tradition of canvassing for the ANC can only be carried out by branches, as it is where members are and these people know the areas that they are canvassing in. Is the role of the ANC branch to mobilise members of the ANC and communities to vote for the ANC during elections, or is there any other significant role that the branch plays in the party?

4.2 The branch as mobilising tool

“ANC branches were called upon by the National Conference to lead mass organisation and mass mobilisation in the regions they are located in, also to lead and organise communities to participate in local development. After Polokwane, a major part of local work was around preparations for the 2009 elections campaign” (Mantashe NGC organisational report: 2010). Branches in this light are seen as a mobilisation agent for the ANC, for the very fact that they are in the midst of communities. Anthony Butler (2009) in his study of the 2009 South African elections notes that “[t]he movement instituted a controversial Imvuselelo campaign soon after the 2004 elections, avowedly to renew branches, increase membership, enhance the ANC’s ‘mass character’, build organisational and administrative capacity, and recruit white, Indians and Coloured activists. It was controversial because it was interpreted as a plot both by and against incumbent Thabo Mbeki” (2009:73). The Imvuselelo campaign, which was a mobilization strategy of the ANC, was an attempt to revive branches and this is what some believe and argue was the same strategy that was employed prior to Polokwane and installed Zuma as the party’s president, although Dlamini (2010) disputes this notion in his study of his Katlehong branch. Noting one ANC member who bulldozed his way to Polokwane “[he] says he was offered R500 to vote for Mbeki, with a promise of R1,000 more to come afterwards. He took the money but voted for Zuma anyway...It is also telling that there was nothing from the ground up, at least from the Fanyana Banda branch, to prove that the Zuma tsunami began in branches” (Dlamini, 2010: 199). This also poses questions about the democratic nature of the branch and its function as the basic unit of the party. Thus I

argue here that the role of the ANC branch is mainly about mobilisation for the party during elections and elective congresses.

Butler (2009: 65) notes that “[a]t the heart of the ANC approach, however, lay an old-fashioned exploitation of the advantage of a mass political party. Luthuli House ensured that branches were revitalised in good time for elections. It relied heavily upon large numbers of volunteers to undertake door-to-door canvassing. It was this, above all, that encouraged eligible electors to register and then vote”. The branch did not only ensure that Zuma became the party’s president but it also assured him the presidency of the Republic. This shows clearly that the branch is very much instrumental in carrying out the mobilisation function that Tordoff (1993) alludes to as the most significant function of political parties. The fact that branches were revived prior the elections shows the significance of the branch for getting the ANC votes, which then can help to answer the question why the ANC needs branches to campaign for it come election time. Dlamini (2010) notes that the branch secretary dominated the ANC meetings which resembled a lecture session with him “merely passing down instructions from the regional office of the ANC” (p193). This was also the case of the Manzini Branch, which was dominated by the branch secretary and chairperson of the branch. Thus some members of the party argued that the two had colonised the branch and used it as their own personal property, with them monopolising the decision to convene meetings and the setting of the agenda of meetings. “They [branch secretary and chairperson] call meetings when it suits them and not according to our needs or the ANC constitution, that we have to meet at least once a month” (Dumisane. Interview: 7/7/2010). Using Michels (1958) elite democracy theory, the dominance of the branch secretary and chairperson of the branch is due to the fact that the masses relegate their power to the elite for they see the need for leadership. The need for leadership then undermines the democratic nature of the party and the masses are only consulted when they have to vote for new leaders or vote the party back into power. “He [branch secretary] informs (sic) the meeting that the regional office has decreed that, until the April 2009 elections, all ANC branches executive committees [BECs] in the area will be transformed into branch election teams and that there will be no regular branch meetings until after the elections” (Dlamini, 2010: 193). The fact that the region transformed BECs to election teams and that branch work was suspended during the election clearly shows the role that the branch plays in the electioneering process and how it mobilises

for the party, come elections. The branch comes to life then when it has to mobilise for the party during elections and dies between them. Dlamini's (2010) experiences in his Kathlehong branch are also mirrored in the Manzini branch, where most of the meetings were about giving out information from the region. For an example in one meeting the branch secretary had to convene a meeting to inform the branch of training of volunteers to carry-out the door-to-door campaign of the ANC for the 2011 Local government election that afternoon. The fact that branches die between elections and conferences opens space for elites to dominate the branch structure and the ANC at large, for members between elections and conferences relegate the function and the life of the branch to the leaders who in turn dominate the party and who when they want re-election, descend to the masses to seek their support.

The meetings that I attended as part of my fieldwork were poorly attended. Indeed they failed to obtain a quorum and this led to the disbandment of the branch. Meetings leading up to the BGM had a better attendance even though they did not form a quorum but the attendance was better than meetings earlier in the year. The main reason that led members to start attending these meetings was that the fact that they wanted the branch to launch and elect the new BEC and the fact that they did not want the branch to be disband. The branch was eventually disbanded by the region for it failed to have its BGM in the specified time, and resulted in the formation of a Branch Task Team (BTT). Members of the ANC argued prior to the disbandment of the branch that if the branch was disbanded it will mean that there will be no formal structure of the party that would be recognized by the region and the ANC Nationally and that will mean that the region will run the branch and even fall prey to the region imposing a candidate for the councillorship on them. Thus after the branch was disbanded the new BTT insured that the branch launched within two weeks and a new BEC was elected. Members of the ANC came in their numbers to the BGM which was organised by the BTT because of the mobilisation drive taken by the BTT. The mobilisation drive was one that clearly showed that the masses are only consulted when they have to elect the new leadership of the party, in this case, the branch. Their main strategy was door-to-door canvassing and encouraging members to come to the BGM to elect the leaders of the branch who would ensure that the election campaign of the ANC runs smoothly and that they nominate a suitable candidate for the councillorship.

4.2.1 Imvuselelo Campaign as a Mobilisation tool

The BTT employed the ‘Imvuselelo campaign’ to mobilise its members to ensure that the branch had the BGM in two weeks as it was instructed by the region. One of the Polokwane resolutions was that branches remained the basic unit of the organisation and instructed leaders of the ANC to “[i]ntensify branch work in each community through the Imveselelo campaign, to ensure that sustainable mass work and establish ANC branches as vanguards of their communities...” (Polokwane Resolution: 2007). The Imvuselelo campaign was to be employed by branches to make sure that the ANC has one million membership by 2012 when it celebrates its centenary. The campaign will include “[d]oor-to-door teams [who] will visit all households to recruit new members and check that existing members are up to date with their membership subscription. The recruitment of new members in each ANC branch must be done in the context of contributing to the target of one million membership by the centenary of the ANC as determined by our forebears in the 1942 National Conference. They should know that existing and new members know about meetings of the branch and how to get involved in branch activities” (Imvuselelo Campaign Media Statement: 12/08/2010). The BTT implemented this ‘Imvuselelo campaign’ in its quest to launch the branch by going to members of the organisations who were no longer participating in the activities of the branch asking them to return to the branch and informing them on when the branch would have its BGM. There was a huge commitment from ANC members that attended meetings, to go and get ANC members who had since stopped participating in the branch to come back and participate. But the main aim here was that these members should come to the BGM so that they could form a quorum which the ANC constitution notes is fifty percent plus one of the membership of the branch, so that they would be able to elect the new leadership of the branch. This showed clearly that the mobilisation drive which was implemented by the BTT was about the election of the new BEC leaders, confirming Michels’s (1958) point that the masses are only called upon when they have to elect new leaders of the party. It also shows that with the Local Government elections approaching, the ANC realised that it needs the masses and branches to mobilise in their communities so that they can secure victories for the ANC in these wards.

The mobilisation drive of the BTT included calling all ANC members who attended these meeting to go to their respective neighbourhoods and identify ANC members who had stopped participating in Branch meetings and inform them that the branch had to launch in two weeks. 'Invuselelo' campaign came alive, where members of the ANC who had since relegated their powers to the leaders of the party were called upon to participate in the life of the organisation in this case to participate in the BGM. The mobilisation drive was successful as the branch managed to launch as the BGM formed a quorum. What the 'Invuselelo campaign' in the branch actually revealed was how branches are revitalised prior to elections. The branch was revitalised prior to the BGM which was to elect the BEC structure of the branch and then facilitate the nomination process of the candidate to represent the ANC branch in the 2011 Local Government election as the ward councillor. This raises questions on how elites use the masses to get to position of power and how the masses themselves after electing leaders relegate their power to these leaders. The 'Invuselelo campaign' was about reminding those members who have since stopped participating in the party that they are still members of the party. Why would members need to be reminded that they are members if they joined the party voluntarily?

This could be attributed to some of the factors that I have highlighted in chapter three on how branches are manipulated by branch leadership to win election within the ANC, that you have the commercialisation or commodification of branches, members-of-members and ghost members. These factors are the ones that impact on the internal democracy within the ANC and thus branches fail to launch or form a quorum for BGMs. Because of the fact that some members did not join the party out of their own initiative or accord; instead their membership subscriptions were paid by some members, usually the leadership of the branch or people who have leadership ambitions, who wanted them to vote for them. Thus Dumisane, who was one of my participants argued that, especially the leadership of the branch, speaks of 'bantu bami' (my people or my members), because they have paid the subscriptions for these members and they come to meetings when called by these leaders and do not participate in the life of the branch. The branch in this light is used for instrumental reasons, which include voting for leaders and mobilising for the ANC when elections dawn.

The Imvuselelo campaign does not only aim at mobilising for the party to reach the centenary target of one million members but is also about building branches. “The Imvuselelo campaign is an ANC campaign aimed at building strong and vibrant ANC branches, which are capable of providing leadership to all sectors of the population and which are visible in community development efforts and struggles at ward level” (Imvuselelo Campaign Media Statement: 12/08/2010). Building strong branches will enable the ANC to be visible in wards which will help legitimise the ANC government and ANC led municipalities as people will see the structure of the party in the ward that they live in. Torfoff (1993) also notes that another function of political parties is one of legitimising the party, strong branches that are visible in community can also help in legitimising the ANC. Thus one participant, Stalin, argued that “[t]he reason why people say they only see the ANC before election is because it is the time when it [ANC] distances itself from government and comes to the ground to campaign for votes but when it is in government it brings service delivery, thus the ANC is government. And when the ANC is in government we don’t say ‘the ANC is doing this for you but say government is doing this for you’ because we are not doing it for only ANC members but we are doing it for everyone” (Stalin. Interview: 07/08/2010). This participant argued that people on the ground only see the ANC when they do door-to-door campaigns for the ANC. From Stalin’s quote one can see how the branch is used by the ANC to mobilise during election time, thus the participant argued that during elections the ANC descend to the masses from government to mobilise for the party, which also helps in legitimising the party.

The mass mobilisation that the organisation puts emphasis on can only be carried out by branches. “The ANC brings about service delivery through government but when it comes to the ground to campaign it doesn’t come as government but as a political structure which wants votes to return to government” (Stalin. Interview: 07/08/2010). Election campaigning is another major role of ANC branches, thus the ANC emphasises that branches should be revitalized during these periods and carry-out the imvuselelo campaign. This clearly shows that branches are used by the party to win elections, for the fact that they can mobilise for the party because of their strategic location in the midst of communities. What Stalin alludes to, is the fact that there is no branch or it is invisible to the community once they have won elections and they are in government. This also raises the issue of who are these branch members and BEC members who are responsible for the life of the branch. Most of the BEC

members are government officials and others work in public institutions. This explains why BEC members see government programmes and service delivery as ANC programmes which also raises the issue about blurring the line between government and the party (ANC). Thus him arguing that when they campaign for the ANC they do not come as government but as the ANC. One could argue that the fact that the ANC is only visible when elections come means there is no ANC branch, thus the branch was disbanded and launched again before the Local Government election. I would argue that there is a possibility that the branch will be disbanded again after the election or after their BGM or people who participated in large numbers would stop attending once the election euphoria dies. But the Imvuselelo campaign offers hope that branches can be revitalised moving forward because it has two main objectives which are mobilisation for the local government elections and recruiting new members to reach the one million benchmark by 2012 when the party celebrates its one hundred years. The question is whether the branch can sustain this campaign? Can mass mobilisation be maintained after the elections and the centenary of the organisation?

Gwede Mantashe notes that: “[t]he Imvuselelo Campaign, launched in May 2010, aims to consolidate membership recruitment and support branch work. Provinces report that, as part of this campaign, PEC members have been deployed to regions to support branches and work with RECs to induct branches. Dedicated political education campaigns are targeting branches. In the few instances where branches took up local issues, especially programme based on Manifesto priorities, the profile of the ANC improved. Following the service delivery protests after the 2009 elections, NEC members have been deployed to different regions to assist branches with developing local campaigns and dealing with service delivery and local development challenges” (NGC State of the Organisation: 2010). The Imvuselelo campaign which focuses on branch work, especially the mobilisation function of the branch, clearly shows that the role of the branch is one that mobilises for the party. Thus RECs, PEC and even NEC members have joined in the campaign to make sure that the organisation has strong branches which in turn will guarantee the party votes in the 2011 local government elections and achieving the one million membership target by 2012 when the party celebrates its one hundred years of existence. Tordoff (1993) argues that one of the functions of political parties is the legitimising function, the fact that NEC members have been deployed to regions which has branches and wards that experienced service delivery protests shows that the branch actual plays this legitimising function. The branch plays this legitimising function

because these service delivery protests happens in the wards where branches are located and to curb them the ANC uses the branch as a mechanism to deal with service delivery issues and to assist branches to be involved in developmental issues in their wards. And for the disgruntled members of the community to be able to use the ANC branch to lodge their discontent with ANC ward councillor with the branch leadership who can then hold the councillor to account, and curb service delivery protests.

“All the structures may appear in good shape and theoretically strong, but if there are no branches, or branches are weak, there is no organisation, as there can be no organisational life. No campaign can be sustained if the branches are weak” (Mantashe. NGC State of the Organisation: 2010). Branches in this light are the pillar of the organisation which makes the organisation visible in communities and can carry the mass work of the party. Thus Mantashe argues that no campaign of the ANC can succeed if there are no branches. This clearly shows that the significance of the branch is one that has to deal with the mobilisation for the organisation. Thus I argue that branches are used by the ANC as mobilisation tools thus some participants echoed Mantashe’s argument that there is no organisation without branches. Is it because branches are the mobilising tool for the ANC in times of elections or because branches are central to the life of the organisation?

One participant, Freddy Ngwenya, argued that the branches are revived during general and local government elections noting that “[i]t is usually like that, that when we go to election we become active we even go and get extra man-power and mobilise people to come and assist us to elect who should stand as the councillor and after that we use them to mobilise going to the election. After the elections it depends on how active is the new BEC which is elected before election. If they do not have a programme of action (PAO) it then dies, which is always the case. Because the POA is there one that will make us to have regular meetings” (Interview: 01/09/2010). Freddy Ngwenya blames the BEC for the failing to maintain or keeping the branch alive after election. I argue that the fact that the BEC lacks a POA is because of the mobilisation function of branches. That branches are not solely used for mobilisation during elections but it is their major role in the life of the ANC thus during elections the REC, PEC and even the NEC descend to branches to mobilise the masses thus the Imvuselelo campaign. As one participant noted, the people only see the ANC when it

leaves government and come to communities through branches canvassing for their vote. This clearly shows the disjuncture between what the ANC says is the role of the branch which includes having general meeting every month and the BEC to meet every fortnight and have a plan of action which will address some of the developmental issues in the ward or in the communities. This could be caused by the fact that the branch tends to be dominated by the local leadership, BEC members, which many have blamed for the dysfunctionality of the branch and attributed the disbandment of the branch to them. Thus if the Imvuselelo campaign can be sustained it could lead to strong branches, contributing to the development of their communities.

Imvuselelo is a Zulu and Swati word which means revival, the naming of the election campaign Imvuselelo means that the ANC itself acknowledges that branches die between elections thus when elections come, they must be revived. The reason for the death of the branch after election could be attributed to the fact that branches are seen by many as mobilisation tool for the organisation; that when elections come the branches have to carry the mass work of the party. Thus Mantashe has noted the same pattern when it comes to elective congresses: that there is “a sharp drop in the eligibility of branches(which) goes hand-in-hand with the tendency to have a growth of membership in periods around elective conferences at all levels of the organisation, followed by the sharp decline after conferences” (NGC State of the Organisation: 2010). This could explain why the branch was disbanded and managed to launch prior to the Local Government elections and had a BGM which elected the new leadership of the branch (BEC). This then begs the question of whether it would be sustained after the election. I argued that it will not, because if it was revitalised because of the Local Government elections and after the election people might participate leading to the 100 years celebration of the movement, but what will follow is the worst. Using Robert Michels’s (1958) analysis, the dysfunctionality of branches or the fact that they are revived in the lead up to elective congresses could be attributed to the notion that the masses see the need for leaders.

“In the life of modern democratic parties we may observe signs of similar indifference. It is only a minority which participates in party decisions, and sometimes that minority is ludicrously small. The most important resolution taken by the most democratic of parties, the

socialist party, always emanates from a handful of members” (Michels, 1958: 55). The masses, in this case the , sees the need for them to elect leaders that must run the day-to-day functioning of the party and their participation is largely during elective congresses including that of the branch. As Zanele, one of my participants, observed, that the leaders of the BEC turn to dominate the day-to-day activities of the branch with them deciding on when to have branch meetings and the issues that have to be discussed. The need for leadership notion that Michels (1958) allude to could also explain the reasons why I argue that the branch is going to die after the Local Government elections and the 2012 Centenary National Conference. For many of the people that participate in branch activities are concerned about making sure that the ANC wins the Local Government elections especially the unemployed youth, for whom the victory of the ANC equals job opportunities in the local municipality. This I will detail in the subsequent chapter about patronage networks and the link between the municipality and the ANC.

4.2.2 The Branch as an electioneering tool

With the Local government election looming in 2011 the branch was revitalised and most importantly focusing on choosing or electing the person who was going to represent the ANC branch in the elections as ward councillor. Members came in their full numbers after the branch was launched and it had been made clear by the region that they had to nominate their candidate for the Local Government elections. The ANC YL, ANC Women’s League and the ANC ‘mother body’ all had preferred candidates for who should represent the ANC in the elections. Events prior to this revival of the branch, which includes the disbandment of the branch, some of my participants argued, was because of the fact that the branch had focused their energies in the upcoming Local Government elections and forgot about the life of the branch which lead to the region to disband it. Tordoff (1993) argues that one of the roles of a political party is to legitimise the party especially when it is in government and the branch plays a crucial role in this regard. By making sure that the people on the ground are involved in the nomination process on who should represent the party as the ANC councillor in the 2011 elections.

The nomination process of the councillor started in the branch where a general meeting was convened and it formed a quorum and before the meeting started there were small groups of

people lobbying for their candidates. The ANC Women's League had their caucus for about an hour outside the hall where the meeting was scheduled. The ANC YL on the other hand had its members lobbying for their candidates like one youth league member who came up to me and said "Cadre sinika (we are giving) Macuzu [name of candidate changed] neh! The Youth League must lead it is our time now". What was interesting in this encounter was that the mobilisation function of the branch was not only about recruiting new members to the party but also was about mobilising for certain leaders within the party. Thus in chapter three I detailed how branches are manipulated by members who have leadership ambition. In this case the councillorship which comes with perks was contested within the ANC. I will detail the reason why people support certain candidates for the councillorship in chapter five.

The mobilisation drive on the day was tense to such extent that by the time we went into the hall the ANC was divided amongst candidates and the seating arrangement was based on who supported whom. When the nomination processes came the regional deployee said that he was going to take as many hands as possible and all nominated candidates will be taken to the community where the community would decide who they wanted to represent the ANC. The fact that the broader community is included in the nomination process shows the legitimising function of the branch that Tordoff (1993) alludes to. The fact that the community had to endorse or nominate their preferred candidates out of all the candidates that the branch had nominated shows how the ANC wants to legitimise the councillor once he or she is elected as the ward councillor. This could be another way the ANC is trying to curb service delivery protests because the community prior to voting for the councillor was included in nominating the person that they thought will represent their interests best. But some might argue that this process is about voting before voting, because the community votes on who should represent the ANC as a councillor in the branch and that candidate who is nominated then stands a better chance of being voted the councillor in the elections. When people go to the polls they are only going to formalise or install the councillor which they had already elected prior to the elections. But what then happens if the preferred candidate is overlooked?

Gwede Mantashe in a media statement noted that "[i]n taking forward the resolution of our 52nd Conference in Polokwane we have already adopted a selection criterion that involves the full participation of the communities in the selecting our candidates for the forth-coming

elections. The ANC will, for the first time, test its candidates with the communities, through Community meetings” (Mantashe: Media Statement: 1/12/2010). This process is one that will help the ANC in making sure that it legitimises the councillors that will be elected or voted in the 2011 Local Government. The involvement of communities in the nomination process of the councillor, could be a strategy that the ANC wants to employ to make sure that the communities vote for members that they know and also to try and curb the service delivery protests against councillors who communities argue are not delivering services. Unlike in the past, as one participant, Zakhele, said, when I asked him about the procedure that was used to nominate the councillor in the ward, he said there was none, at least in the past Local Government election, when they only saw posters of the candidate that they had to vote for and did not know the process that was followed in choosing him, arguing that the region imposed a candidate on them and ‘because we love the ANC we voted for him’.

The branch in this light is used for election purposes, to help the ANC win elections. Thembelihle, who was one participant, argued that the ANC only came down to the branches when it wants the people to vote for it in elections, the reason being that branches are the ones that are closest to the people or the voters. Thus when elections come, even the president of the organisation and the NEC leadership descend on the masses to appeal for their vote and branches play a crucial role in securing votes for the party. As Butler (2009) notes, the most successful and effective mobilisation strategy employed by the ANC in the 2009 election and elections before, was the door-to-door campaign. This campaign is based on volunteers from branches who go around their neighbourhood encouraging people to vote for the ANC in their communities and has proved effective in the past. The branch in this regard is then used to mobilise for the party during election time, thus after elections the branch turns to die because there are no activities that people can relate to as significant as those of mobilising for the party. Thus I ask the question why do people especially the unemployed see the value of their participation in this door-to-door campaign, what is in for them? This question I will explore in the subsequent chapters.

4.3 Conclusion

The branch I argue in this chapter is used by the ANC for mass mobilisation, which is one of the function that Tordoff (1993) argues is the most important role or function of political parties. Thus the ANC notes that branches tend to die between elections and elective conferences of all scales. The reasons for this I argue is because of the fact that the branches are the party's structure which is closest to the people, and using Michels's (1958) elite democracy theory. The masses are used by the leaders to get into positions of power, thus branches are revived prior to elective congresses. The branch I studied was disbanded for failing to launch and convene its BGM, which others argued was due to the fact that BEC had colonised the branch and treated it as their private property. Thus it was disbanded by the region. I also argue that the branch is used by the ANC for electioneering purposes, citing the Imvuselelo campaign as the epic of the election mobilisation function of the branch. The Imvuselelo campaign is based on door-to-door canvassing for the party which many have attribute the ANC victory to. This campaign is one that clearly shows why the ANC branch is revitalised at the dawn of election for it is the one that mobilises the members of communities to vote the party, which since 1994 it has managed to convince the masses. The Imvuselelo campaign also contributes to legitimising the ANC, which is another function that Tordoff (1993) cites as an important function that the party plays, to legitimise the party in government. Getting the endorsement of the people is achieved through elections that are declared free and fair. Thus the branch plays a vital role in the electioneering process for the party. Large number of volunteers participate in these electioneering processes, in particular the door-to-door campaign. It is important to understand why people participate in this, while others have turned against the ANC at the local level, through service delivery protests. The subsequent chapter details how the ANC branch offers an avenue for patronage networks for the unemployed youths through the local state of the municipality. Suffice it to say that the ANC branch does not only serve the party with its mobilisation ability but also has some functions, which the ANC constitution highlights which include policy formulation and implementation, which Tordoff (1993) argues is another function of political parties. This was not evident in my case study, but does not deny it happens in other branches which are more vibrant than the one under study. In conclusion, I argue that the ANC branch does not look like the ANC constitution says it should, holding meetings once a month and BEC

members meeting every fortnight. The branch, I argue here, is used to mobilise for the party during both national and local government elections and during elective congresses. There is clearly a disjuncture between what the branch ought to be doing and what it is actually doing in reality. Even though the ANC constitution and other legislative documents of the party cite that the party should mobilise come elections and elective congress but that is not the sole role of the branch. In reality the branch is used mostly for this mobilisation function which tend to overshadow the other functions of the branch, making it mobilisation machinery.

Chapter 5: The ANC branch and Patronage

5.1 Introduction

One question that this chapter seeks to address is: why would people participate in the branch and also mobilise for the party? What is in it for them, why do they participate and mobilise for the party? Tordoff (1993) cites patronage as another role of political parties where voters are rewarded for voting the party into government or into power, and certain individuals rewarding their supporters that elected them to the leadership of the party. It is the intention of this chapter to try to explore how the patronage function of the party is carried out in the ANC, in this case, how are patronage networks formed at the branch level; do they exist? If so, how are patronage networks created and how does that affect the functioning of the municipality and the accountability of the ward councillor?

5.1.1 Cadre deployment as a transformation of state policy

The ANC, when it came to power in 1994 after the first democratic election of the country, was to be faced with the fact that the state did not represent the demographics of the country and reflected apartheid laws, notably the Job Reservation Act. The Act reserved certain jobs, especially supervisor and managerial work, for white people and blacks were to perform only manual labour. The legacy of apartheid was one that was to haunt the ANC for decades. Thus its policies had to try to address the legacy of apartheid. The ANC, in response to the Job Reservation Act, undertook a major drive to try to redress the ills of apartheid, in particular with regard to the public service and to try to make sure that the state and its departments reflected the demographics of the country. In its 1997 Strategy and Tactics document the ANC argued that: “The civil service, the judiciary, the army, the police, the intelligence structures were all moulded to attain the opposite of what we intend to achieve. Thus it is a critical part of the ANC’s programme to change the doctrines, the composition and the management style of all these structures to reflect and serve South African society as a whole. This includes the involvement of more and more of those who were discriminated against, especially blacks, women and the disabled, and a particular sensitivity to their needs and interests” (Strategy and Tactics: 1997). This meant that the whites that dominated the state had to make way for the blacks who are the majority in the country. This was to be implemented through a number of policies including the cadre deployment policy of the

ANC. Naidoo (2005) notes that the transformation of the public service by the ANC government put emphasis on integration which involved “the amalgamation of a scattered pre- 1994 system comprising 15 administrations serving 11 different governments, including four ‘independent’ states and six self-governing territories (Adler 2000 cited in Naidoo, 2005: 113). Naidoo (2005) also notes that “[i]ntegration has also necessitated a more appropriate weighted representation of the country’s population in the public service to redress a historically unequal distribution of decision making in power based on race preference” (p113). Municipalities also had to follow suit with the transformation project that the party was implementing, through the deployment policy of the ANC. This deployment policy of the ANC has come under constant fire from the media and the opposition parties in particular the DA, which have accused the ANC of undermining democracy through the policy and compromising efficiency by its policy of cadre deployment. This, the DA notes, is causing failure of many municipalities which have recently experienced service delivery protests, because service delivery is being compromised by the fact that the people’s needs do not come first, loyalty to the party takes precedence. Toeing the party line and doing what one is told by the party informs the decision that many ANC members and officials take. This chapter will try to interrogate how the policy of cadre deployment has affected the functioning of the municipality and how this opens patronage networks which then affect the functioning of the municipality and the internal democracy within ANC branches as well as the accountability of ward councillors to the communities that they represent.

“Historically, the patronage function of political parties has been important and in some cases remains so today, especially in multi-party states where parties promise future patronage in return for electoral support” (Tordoff, 1993: 107). Since the branch is the sphere or organ of the ANC that is closest to the people many might expect that patronage networks might be forged at this level of the party. Thus this chapter seeks to investigate how the branch carries out this patronage function or whether it does not. Are people participating in the branch because there is something in it for them or for the love and the life of the organisation? This is the central question guiding this chapter. As highlighted in the chapter above, one of the strong functions of the branch is to help the ANC to win elections through door-to-door canvassing. This has become the most effective campaign mechanism that is employed by the party. This chapter wants to try to understand why would volunteers come out in their numbers to carry out this door-to-door canvassing of the party.

5.1.2 Cadre deployment as a patronage network

The cadre deployment policy that the ANC implemented when they came to power as a transformative measure is one that led to a number of problems. These problems include the fact that in strategic positions, especially at local level, ANC loyalists were preferred over competent members of the public. “Subsequently, after assuming office, nationalist parties benefitted from gaining access to well paid jobs, state resources and control over national budgets, which allowed them to determine who would obtain benefits, and where they should be located” (Southall, 2009: 6). Here Southall offers an understanding of what happens to liberation movements after winning the first democratic elections of their countries. The fact that the party after independence has access to the state means that they could use the very state to reward their members or party loyalist. Most of the time this is done through deployment of the party’s loyalist in state institutions, government departments and other areas where the state has control. Municipalities are used by the branch and the region to reward members of the party. Thus many of my participants blamed the councillor for failing to get them jobs in the municipality even though he was part of the mayoral committee. “Key to all developments has been the ANC’s capture of the state at all levels - national, provincial and local – and the opportunities for the party and networks within it to allocate positions, procurements and privileges to party loyalists and those connected with them. There was already extensive public awareness of the cancerous growth of patronage and corruption under Mbeki. If anything, there is now a conviction that the rot has become worse under Zuma” (Southall, 2009: 14). This cancerous growth of patronage that Southall notes is one that informs the decision of many people to join ANC branches because for them, as one participant said ‘the struggle is no longer the same, we are no longer fighting apartheid, but to get jobs, the struggle is about jobs now’(Jabu. Interview: 20/07/2010). And the only way they can get jobs is through joining the ANC because it is in power and rewards its loyalist. Thus many, in particular the DA, have questioned the deployment policy of the ANC.

“Deployed cadres are perceived to have crippled service delivery in many municipalities” the newspaper stated, noting that a culture of “patronage and nepotism” had become so rife in municipalities that they have become inaccessible and unaccountable. “The lack of values, principles or ethics...indicates that there are officials and public representatives for whom

public service is not a concern, but accruing wealth at the expense of the poor is” (Zille: 2009). The deployment policy is linked to patronage networks where party loyalists are rewarded with positions in government. Thus the DA argues that the deployment policy of the ANC undermines and overlooks people who can do the job and competent applicants over loyal cadres of the organisation. Thus the ‘Zunami’ can be attributed to the patronage networks that those who were sidelined under the Mbeki tenure felt that rallying behind Zuma would open; an opportunity to gain access to state resources which has been the intention of many cadres of the organisation.

“The most interesting aspect of this meeting was the frank analysis by various mayors, of the impact of “cadre deployment” on service delivery. One mayor complained that the local ANC structures in her town regarded her as a deployed cadre. This meant she could not fulfil her functions as mayor. When she sought to take an impartial decision in the interests of good governance, she was countermanded. She was told that unless she followed the party’s instructions she would be “redeployed”. The party’s instructions, of course, come from a small clique of local leaders, usually seeking to promote their personal wealth and influence”. (Zille: 2009).

This statement was made by the leader of the DA after a meeting convened by the president of the country Jacob Zuma to discuss the failures and the crises of Local Government with mayors from municipalities throughout South Africa. What is profound about it is the fact that since mayors are deployed cadres of the party they have to toe the party line or else face redeployment and at times toeing the party line is in contradiction with good governance. Thus as deployed cadres of the party many people anticipate these councillors and mayors have to reward them for deploying them in the municipality, and jobs are what many want as a reward from their councillors and mayors. Some councillors promise the masses and members of the party patronage or rewards if they win as councillors of the party. One reason why members of the ANC expect patronage and reward from these councillors is that in the nomination processes when they lobby for votes they promise certain members jobs and other public goods in return for their support. Thus they become indebted to the members and have to reward them when they assume office. These ward councillors become indebted to the party members thus, when in power, have to pay back these people who nominated and voted

for them to be councillors. Failing to do so, leads to party members revolting or protesting against these councillors, not because they are failing to provide service delivery, but because they are failing to reward their supporters. The internal nomination process of the ANC for their councillors is one that can lead to members of the party to refer to party councillors as deployed cadres, for the fact that they were voted into their positions under the ANC name and were nominated by the ANC to represent them. One participant argued that the current ward councillor, Sibeko, was unknown to them, but they voted for him because he was representing the ANC. Members who vote for a particular individual in the party do so because they support the party, ANC, and not the individual unless the individual had promised them patronage after his ascendancy to power. Thus members refer to mayors and councillors as deployed cadres of the party because being a councillor is interpreted by many as a reward to loyal cadres of the party.

The deployment policy of the ANC which is used in the appointment of mayors and other senior municipal officials is one that leads to lack of service delivery as people have to toe the part line and at times the party line undermines service delivery. Mr Mobota who is a municipal official argues that the lack of service delivery in the municipality is linked to party politics within the ANC. “You know the issue of deployment, you find people who are executive mayors and municipal managers who are people that have been deployed. The challenge is that these people they’ve got a mandate to serve those people” (Interview: 18/10/2010). He argued that even though the ANC does want to deliver on certain services, because if they do not deliver that will have a negative impact on them, deployed cadres in these senior positions consult the party every time a major decision has to be made. “Let’s say I were to be given the municipal manager position. The challenges is that you need to make sure that you run the municipality and it performs well, you need to make sure that you...you represent the organisation [ANC] in the running of the municipality. So you find that in most cases that most of these guys don’t take decisions. Because if you have been deployed you can’t just take a decision some of these guys have to consult and when you consult whether you like or not what prevail in that consultation must go, because you have been deployed. Remember the principle behind deployment, is that when I deploy you, you must do what I want you to do if you don’t do that I will recall you or redeploy you. Which becomes a challenge to those officials because they have limited power and this affects service delivery” (Ibid). Thus the DA leader, Helen Zille blames the deployment policy of the

ANC for the lack of service delivery. One municipal official also noted that the internal squabbles of the ANC also affect service delivery. “If you are not in my ANC you’ll be fired” (Mr Mabena. Interview: 18/10/2010). Mr Mabena also noted that certain party members who support the DD Mabuza camp have been deployed in the Mbombela Municipality to make sure that the municipality fails to deliver on services and the mandate of the ANC so that it will look bad on the Mayor, so that he could be recalled. This shows clearly that the in-fighting within the ANC spills over to the running of the municipality and the provision of service delivery.

Mr Mabena who is also a municipal official noted the link between the ANC and the functioning of the Municipality: “[w]hen you look at South Africa where you have a good ANC structure in the province or region municipalities are also good and perform. Where there are problems within the ANC structures municipalities don’t have leadership and fail” (Interview: 18/10/2010). This clearly shows that the functioning of a municipality is linked with the functioning of the ANC, where party battles are taken to the municipality, for the failure of the municipality will reflect badly on certain party leaders and subject them to recall by the party as their deployees of the party. Thus I argue that the councillors and deployed municipal officials are caught between being accountable to the communities that they represent and providing services to them and toeing the party line. “When you talk about ANC you are talking about government and you can’t separate the running of the municipality and the ANC, it is government” (Mr Mabena. Interview: 18/10/2010). The blurring of the party and the state, in this case the municipality, is one that affects service delivery, because in-fights within the ANC spill over to the municipality and affect their functioning. Thus Mr Mabena argued that a good ANC leads to a good municipality that provides for its citizens. The deployment policy of the ANC serves then as a way of disciplining those who do not toe the party line and rewarding those who do.

5.1.3 The Councillorship as a reward to ‘discipline’ cadres of the ANC

The new councillor nomination process which was discussed in chapter four involves the communities. After the ANC branch has nominated their preferred candidates, the community is called to present the candidates and asked to endorse one candidate that they think can best represent their interest in the ward. “Last year, ANC leader Gwede Mantashe

said the party wanted communities to choose candidates so it could get as much support as possible during the upcoming municipal pools planned to take place on May 18” (City Press: 19/02/2011). Communities were to be included in the nomination process of the candidates for the party in the municipal elections. One of the methods that the ANC branches uses to nominate their candidate for the councillorship is to look at one’s struggle credentials. Thus many people that I interviewed about the nomination processes argued that one must have some struggle credentials. The one participant argued that “ we have to reward these people who have spent their lives struggling for the ANC and one way of doing it is by making them ward councillors” (Jabu. Interview: 20/07/2010). He argued that the ANC cannot have their struggle heroes unemployed while they have young ward councillors who have no struggle history. Thus he argued that the people (struggle heroes or activists) that many today argue cannot serve as ward councillors because they do not have a ‘*metric*’ [grade 12] or formal education were wrong “because these people sacrificed their youth for the party and the people, they must be rewarded and the councillorship is another way that they could be rewarded” (Ibid). What is clear here is the fact that people see the need for the party’s old guard or those people who have participated in the struggle against apartheid to be rewarded and the ward councillorship position is one that could be used as a way of paying these comrades back. Patronage networks are created or forged by the ward councillor’s position.

“We once again affirmed the solemn pledge which commits us to abide by the aims and objectives of our organisation, to participate actively in our movement without motives of material gains, to work towards making the ANC an even more effective instrument in the hands of the people and to defend unity, cohesion and integrity of our organisation and the movement that it leads” (Kgalema Motlanthe: 2007 Organisational Report). The pledge that all ANC members take attest to the fact that people who join the ANC are doing so to serve the needs of South Africans and to champion what the ANC envisions for the country and that people do not join the party because of their narrow interests which include material gains. But what has happened is that people, especially the young and unemployed, now join the party because of what they could benefit through it. Thus one participant argued that for him to join the ANC is about making connections with some of the senior ANC members who can, in turn, help him to find a job. He argued that “you see now to get a job is all about connection, without it you won’t get employed” (Jabu. Interview: 20/07/2010). One can see

from this statement that people now join the ANC because of what is in it for them, in this case, jobs. People participate in ANC branch activities, especially when they have to do mobilisation for the party during election time, because as one participant argued “if you don’t participate in such activities, like the door-to-door campaign you won’t get a job” (Dumisane. Interview: 7/72010) Patronage networks are thus formed through the branch and those who participate in programmes, including the ‘*invuselelo campaign*’ which is aimed at making sure that the party has 1 million members by the time they celebrate their 100 years in 2012. But one of the main reasons that informed certain individuals to join the party is the patronage network that is formed through the party especially at the local level.

The ANC oath of the Constitution of the party argues that “[o]n being accepted in the ANC, a new member shall, in a language he or she knows well, make the following solemn declaration to the body or person designated to administer such oaths:

I,, solemnly declare that I will abide by the aims and objectives of the African National Congress as set out in the Constitution, the Freedom Charter and other duly adopted policy positions, that I am joining the organisation voluntarily and without motives of material advantage or personal gain, that I agree to respect the Constitution and the structures and to work as a loyal member of the organisation, that I will place my energies and skills at the disposal of the organisation and carry out tasks given to me, that I will work towards making the ANC an even more effective instrument of liberation in the hands of the people, and that I will defend the unity and integrity of the organisation and its principles, and combat any tendency towards disruption and factionalism” (ANC Constitution: 2007).

People joining the party do take this oath but that does not mean that they do not break the oath. Thus one participant argues that he has attended all ANC conferences from regional congresses to the National Conference and the NGC and defected to Congress of the People (COPE) but has since come back to rejoin the ANC. He notes that that the ANC now is different from the ANC of the past “yabo Mandela” (of Mandela), he argues that now in the ANC “there is an influx of people who join the ANC because of their own narrow interests,

to enrich themselves and not to champion the needs of the poor, even though the party argues that it is a pro-poor organisation. These people join the liberation movement because of their selfish interest, especially in the tendering processes” (Benedict. Interview: 18/09/2010). What is clear from this account is that the ANC has been infiltrated by people who do not want to champion the needs of the poor and the members of the party but because of their own interest, thus breaking the oath that they took when they joined the party. One participant argued that the oath that people take upon joining the movement is nothing but a ceremonial or procedural thing and that members are not abiding by it. “People are meant to join the ANC because they want a better life for all but now we have certain people who join the party because they want to ‘better their lives’ and not the majority of the people”(Stalin. Interview:7/08/2010). The collective, which is what is meant by the ANC election slogan ‘better life for all’, is no longer the case as these participants attest that narrow individualistic tendencies have infiltrated the party. “People lobby for others because of the belief that they would be rewarded for their efforts, the unemployed do it because they want to be seen as the loyal servants of those candidates and will be rewarded with jobs” (Jabu. Interview: 20/07/2010). The fact that people lobby for certain individuals and this is rife in times of elections and nomination processes on who should represent the party as a councillor, because of the fact that they will benefit if a certain individual is elected to power. This is one of the factors that has undermined internal democracy within the party and thus leadership contests are not about ideological differences but about who is to benefit when a certain individual ascends to a higher position in the party.

The patronage network that is forged through branches could also explain the reason why certain factions in branches have recently protested against their region some even going to Luthuli House, the ANC headquarters in Johannesburg, to protest against the fact that their preferred candidates were overlooked by their regions. “Most members complain that candidates preferred by the community are excluded in favour of those linked to certain powerful individuals in the party...In Mpumalanga, more than 20 ANC branches have complained that candidates close to Premier David [DD] Mabuza were selected in three regions: Gert Sibande, Nkangala and Ehlanzeni” (City Press: 19/02/2011). These protests that some members of the party have waged against others, especially regional offices, who have the final say in the councillor nomination process, are due to the fact that patronage networks

are formed through these councillors. And certain individuals are supported because of the fact that they have promised their backers something in return. Thus, in congratulating the preferred candidate for the ANC in the branch, and after he was endorsed by the community, he argued that “[a]m not celebrating yet we must wait for the region, but you know if the region goes against the will of the masses they will revolt” (Telephone Call: 05/02/2011). Luckily enough the region also endorsed him as the candidate of the party in the ward. The reason that many gave for his nomination included the fact that he had struggle credentials, as he was a student activist in the late 1980s and 1990s with COSAS (Congress of South Africa Students). But some argued that he promised them jobs, that if he become the ward councillor he will employ them in the municipality unlike his predecessor who did nothing to empower them.

5.2 The ANC branch as an employment vehicle – “Kuyadlisa kwaKhongolose” [It is happening in the ANC]

Most of my participants, especially the unemployed and the youth, voiced the reasons for them to attend meetings as being about making connections with senior ANC members especially those who worked in government and for the ward councillor. As noted above by one participant who argued getting a job now was all about connections or who one knows. This participant argued that he attended ANC branch meetings to network and to forge connections with senior ANC members and mostly with the ward councillor, who he believed had the power to employ people in the ward. He argued that if one does not attend these ANC meetings it becomes difficult to get a job, especially in the extended public works programmes and other projects that the municipality introduces in the ward. The extended Public Works programmes are programmes implemented by the Provincial Department of Public Works and mainly focus on infrastructure development and improvement while at the same time creating part time employment for locals who are unemployed. Most of the participants including Mlungisi believe that the ward councillor is an employment agent of the municipality, which Councillor Sibeko has disputed. “Many people think that the councillor has the power to hire and especially me, since am part of the mayoral committee, people think that I have more power to employ people which is not the case. Ward councillors don’t have such powers we are just here to represent our people in the municipality if they want something I pass that message to the municipality” (Interview:

2/04/2011). The councillor retaliated that they serve as a link between the municipality and the ward or the communities that they represent as councillors. Malabela and Ally (2011) notes that councillors are mere '*information brokers*', serving as a communication bridge between the municipality and their communities. "...'*information broker*' – that is, his [councillor] sole function was to act as a conduit of information, taking it from the municipality and relaying it to the community, and vice versa. Indeed, the councillor's power derived principally from their role as the intermediary of information, allowing them to broker authority in each space – municipal and ward – on the basis of being the link between the two contexts" (Malabela and Ally, 2010: 11).

But this is not how participants such as Mlungisi perceive them, they want jobs from councillors. Thus most of the candidates that are supported by communities are ones that promise the electorate jobs and other patronage to their backers. Councillor Sibeko noted that the contest for who should represent the ANC is not about people supporting the best candidates instead is about supporting a candidate that promises one something. He argued that the fierce contest that we witnessed when the party had to nominate candidates that had to be presented to the public or community as preferred candidates was not about the best candidate, that members of the party thought was best to represent them, but was about what they would get if that candidate was to be a councillor. He also noted that the reason for service delivery protests in some cases is not the fact that there is lack of service delivery but in turn because certain councillor promised people jobs and failed to deliver on their promises.

"You know many people only realise when they are already councillors that there is no such thing as councillors employing people and they cannot go back to the masses and deliver the bad news. Thus we saw these service delivery protests. Like in my ward many people came to me after the protest was over and said that they protested because of the fact that they saw in other wards people getting employed and they thought that the councillor was the one who was employing them. Thus they said I was not doing my job which was not about service delivery but about job creation" (Councillor Sibeko: 2/04/2011). The patronage network that the people try to forge through the councillorship is one that explains why there is a split between the ANC itself on who should be the ward councillor. As we have witnessed of late

members of the party protesting against the ANC about the party list, that some of their members did not make the list, because of the fact that they rallied behind certain individuals with the hope of them benefiting when they assumed office as ANC councillors. Thus Mlungisi, who was one of my participants, argued that they do support certain camps within the ANC but they do so because of what they think they might benefit if that particular candidate makes it within the party or in government, especially at the lower stratum of government usually local government. Municipalities, when they contract someone to do a specific job in a community, are forced by law to compel the contractor to hire people from that particular area, particularly for the tasks that do not require expertise and experience.

Contractors who obtain these tenders are obliged by the government to employ or create part-time employment for the local residents and a Community Liaising Officer (CLO) is appointed by the councillor to facilitate this process. The CLO's task is to make sure that the contractor gets the labour supply that he or she needs at that particular time and to make sure that the unemployed in the ward get part time employment. Councillor Sibeko in answering how these CLOs are appointed noted that he does not have sole power to appoint the CLO but the ANC makes this appointment. "The ANC as the party governing this ward is the one that decides on who should be the CLO, they only take advice from me and I also have to abide by their decision because I am an ANC councillor, not an independent councillor" (Councillor Sibeko: 02/04/2011). He also noted that all of the CLOs that have been appointed in the past have been ANC members and unemployed members of the party. This clearly shows that the CLO position is given to party members, especially those who are loyal to the party and toe the party line. This CLO position also forms part of how patronage can be forged through local government. The councillor, even though he argues that he only advises the ANC on who should be a CLO when a project comes to the branch, can unleash patronage through this process. He can motivate why he nominates someone to be the CLO. One participant argued that when such programmes [extended public works or any project] come in the ward for one to get such jobs they must be known in the ANC or by the CLO who is usually an ANC member appointed or nominated by the ward councillor and the ANC BEC. As Jacob Dlamini notes of the significance and the power of being a CLO "[t]he job of the CLO is one of the most powerful posts in the township. It comes with a stipend paid by the contractor but its true economic worth comes from the fact that CLOs have the power to dish out jobs" (Dlamini, 2010: 197). The CLO's power to dish out jobs is one that makes

people especially the unemployed, participate in ANC activities, Their participation is seen as showing the ANC that they are committed to the party and that they work for it thus they deserve to be first in line when job opportunities come in the ward. Patronage networks are then formed. Active members of the party are the ones that stand a good chance to get jobs when municipal or government projects come to the ward and the ANC can reward loyal members of the party with part time jobs and punish those who do not support the party by sidelining them when these opportunities come. Thus members participate in activities of the party especially when the branch has to mobilise the community to vote for the party.

Claire Benit-Gbaffou (2010) notes that at the local sphere, government is meant to be more democratic and citizens offered the opportunity to liaise with their representative and hold them to account. She argues that this space has opened space for political clientelism which “is about the distribution of *public goods* (public housing, employment contract, access to social services or skills training programmes, distribution of food parcels, information on public tenders, etc)... Political clientelism is not only about the vote, and occurs largely outside the vote, even if its occurrence increases in electoral times. Political support indeed takes many forms (as outlined by Auyero, 1999): participating in party rallies, campaigning for the party, being the party watchdog in public or local meetings, etc” (p287). The political clientelism that Benit-Gbaffou notes here is about paying back for his or her political loyalty through public goods. Political clientelism can explain why the unemployed in the branch see the need to attend ANC meetings, even though those meeting at times do not form a quorum, meaning that they cannot make major decisions that can affect the life of the organisation. These unemployed members of the party see the need to actually participate in the branch activities because for them participating in these meetings is all about forging connections which might amount to them securing employment.

Thus many people join the ANC not because they want to participate in the life of the party, even though some do, but because they want to benefit their narrow interests. This is one of the tendencies that the ANC secretary Gwede Mantashe and former secretary Kgalema Mothlante noted as one of the crippling factors in the party with the former naming it ‘foreign tendencies’. This self-enrichment aspect of the party is one that is undermining the internal democracy within the ANC because people do not join the party, in this case branches,

because they want to contribute to the life of the party so that it addresses developmental issues in their communities, but because for them the party is a vehicle to form patronage networks and access to state resources. Thus some, when analysing the Zunami or how Zuma became the ANC president, argued that it was because of the people that felt sidelined by Thabo Mbeki. Butler (2009:68-9) notes that “[t]he rise of Zuma was also fuelled by the branch-level discontent about the monopolisation of patronage opportunities by the incumbents, poor service delivery, and the general high-handedness and arrogance that characterised the higher reaches- or even the middling ones- of Mbeki’s administration”. Southall (2009) notes that Gumede (2008) “identifies three other groups as crucial. First the ANC Youth League; second, pro-Zuma black economic empowerment (BEE) oligarchies hoping to secure future patronage; and third, ANC leaders under investigation for corruption who hoped that if Zuma’s case was quashed, theirs will be too” (p323). What could be drawn out here, which also applies to the local branches of the ANC, is that future patronage is one other thing that influences the way members of the party vote on the ground. Thus people support certain individuals for the fact that if they win and go to positions of power they will be rewarded for their loyalty. Thus Mbeki was ousted at Polokwane by those who did not benefit or were not part of his patronage network during his tenure as president of the party and the country.

In 2009 in Manzini for the first time in the history of the ‘Trust’ there was a service delivery protest, with the youth leading the protest. In my interview with the ward councillor, Sibeko, I asked him what were the reasons that the protestors argued or brought forward as their concern, why they were protesting and whether he was failing to deliver in the ward. He argued that the protest had nothing to do with lack of service delivery but was about jobs or employment. As alluded to above, some members of the ANC and the community argued that he was failing to employ people in the ward while some councillors elsewhere were employing members of the party and their community members. He argued that protestors accused him of failing the community especially the unemployed because he did not hire them at the municipality. He said people argued that “ward councillors in some branches were helping ANC members to get jobs and that he was not in his branch, they protested because they want jobs. I tried to explain that I am not the one who is employing people *kamasipala* (at the municipality) and that I was not aware that it was happening in some branches or wards” (Interview: 05/09/2010). Thus it can be contested whether the service delivery protests are really about service delivery or whether they are used to achieve a

particular end. In my case it is clear that the protest was against the councillor failing to unleash patronage in the form of jobs which lead the community, especially the unemployed youth to take to the streets and protest. As one unemployed young participant argued, they are unemployed because the ward councillor is failing to inform the municipality of the high levels of unemployment in the ward. He argued that in some wards and branches ANC councillors were assisting the youth in getting employment in the municipality. This clearly shows that local state as Benit-Gbaffou (2009) notes “is often perceived as more democratic than (sic) other scale government...However, when reflecting on the nature of what makes the local scale potentially more democratic: an increased level of accountability of the office bearers thanks to personal, direct and ordinary contacts with the voters, one cannot but be stricken by the possible clientelist nature of such links, which precisely rely on personal, binding relationships between elected representatives and their voters” (p286). The local representative, in this case the ward councillor, is seen by the voters as an employment agent between the community and the municipality. Thus members of the community blame him for not employing them in the municipality, because in their view the fact that they have their representative in the municipality is their link to jobs. This could explain why the councillor was not popular with most of the unemployed members of the branch, because for them participating in ANC branch activities meant that they would be first in line when patronage had to be dished out by their ward councillor who is an ANC member.

“The branch is dead. People are only in it for what they can get out of it” (Dlamini, 2010: 198). This quote from one of Dlamini’s participants can also explain what is happening in the Manzini branch, that people who participate in branch activities mostly do so because of what they could get from the branch not to champion the needs of the people. I am not dismissing the fact that there are some members of the branch who want development of their community and participate in the branch to champion the needs of their community. As shown above most of the people that participate in the branch, especially the youth want jobs and the patronage networks that the branch offers. It is important to note that the branch does not only serve this narrow interest of some individuals but suffice it to say that these patronage networks are also central to the branch and how it relates to local government. In one meeting I had with a group of ANC members and the ANC BEC chairperson many of the members of the ANC (which were mostly the youth) accused the chairperson, who is a government employee that they were failing the branch members by failing to employ them.

One argued “You are deployed by the ANC in your position and yet you have failed to hire us, ANC members. You know that here in our province [Mpumalanga] to get a job is all about connections, who do you know, and you comrades who are deployed from our branch you are our connections and have to manipulate these employment processes to favour us your comrades” (Interview: 1/08/2010). Patronage networks is what motivates many of these youth to participate in ANC activities as this participant notes that to get a job is about connections and these connections are forged in branches of the party. ANC members who work for government departments are seen by many as deployed and they have to return the favour by employing other ANC members, thus this participant blamed the chairperson of the branch for failing to hire them. The fact that this person who was accused of failing ANC members, about the fact that he did not hire them, was a chairperson of the branch, shows that many expected him to employ or reward them for supporting and electing him to be the chairperson. Many people rally behind individuals because of the fact that they hope that they would be rewarded, by a job or other public goods that the person that they supported might have power to unleash.

5.3 “The ANC protests against the ANC”

The wave of service delivery protests which swept South Africa in 2009 and 2010 was not only about service delivery. Some of the underlying features of the protests were not about service delivery but an attack on the ward councillors. “In more recent incidents, ANC members led mass protests, playing a negative role in the majority of cases. These members seemed to be leading mass protests against the ANC itself, with the aim to position themselves for candidature in the 2011 local government election” (Mantashe: 2010 NGC State of the Organisational Report). The main reason that makes ANC members revolt against their ANC councillors is that these positions, councillor’s positions, come with perks which most people covet. “The reason why people fight for these post of councillors is because of the fact that they see us ward councillors driving nice cars and building nice house thus they also want to be councillors because of the money that we earn” (Councillor Sibeko: 02/04/2011). Councillor Sibeko also noted that the reason why people fight to be councillors even within the ANC is because some have made politics a career and the councillorship is the only post that many people and members of the party qualify for because of their low levels of education. The money factor is one that has led to the fierce competition within the

ANC on who should stand and represent the party in the local government elections. People support certain individuals because of what they are promised by those individuals of what they will give them when they become councillors. As one campaigner said in one informal discussion with some ANC members prior to the nomination of who should represent the party in the upcoming local government election *'if you want a job vote for me to be the next councillor you be employed in no time, but if you are ok with staying la-eskomu (township) vote for the others'*. These utterances are ones that promise patronage and when they fail to deliver on the patronage people take to the streets because they are not getting what they were promised by the incumbent. Future patronage in turn also helps certain individuals to positions of power and they promise certain things that they know that it would be impossible to deliver on. Councillor Sibeko noted that what we witnessed when they had to nominate the new councillor for the next local government was people lobbying on false pretences, arguing that he had promised some members that when they become councillors they will employ them and, an extreme one, promising members tenders. "These are just false promises the councillor doesn't have any influence in the tendering process and employment issues, these individuals I feel sorry for them because if they become councillors people will revolt against them because they wouldn't fulfil the promises they made" (Councillor Sibeko: 02/04/2011). These empty promises or future patronage networks that aspiring councillors make to their members is one that leads to members of the ANC to protest against their own party members. *"The ANC protesting against the ANC"*.

In the broader context of the ANC, the ousting of the aloof Thabo Mbeki in Polokwane, as many authors (Butler 2010, Southall 2009 & 2010) have shown, was due to the fact that he sidelined some people within the ANC especially those in business. Mbeki also concentrated power in the presidency which led to those close to him benefiting from his rule and some members within the ANC felt that they were no longer part of the party, because although their party was in power, they were not benefiting from their party running government. These people who felt sidelined by the incumbent, Thabo Mbeki, felt that the ousting of him and replacing him with someone closer to them would open patronage networks that would benefit them. Thus they rallied behind Jacob Zuma as the man that could challenge and oust Thabo Mbeki from the throne of the party. Those who benefitted in the Mbeki era felt that they should leave the ANC largely because they had lost power within the party and for some they acknowledged the fact that the decade of massive patronage networks which made some

of them millionaires had come to an end. Thus they felt no reason to stay within the ANC for they had lost power and influence within the ANC.

This contestation within the party and the leadership battle are not underlined by deep ideological battles, not dismissing the fact that some within the alliance structures, SACP and COSATU, were against what they termed the '*1996 class project*'. This *class project* was one that implemented Gear (Growth Employment and Redistribution) macro-economic programme with limited consultation from the alliance partners. This neo-liberal macro-economic policy has had negative impacts on the majority of working class people of the country and has pushed inequality to levels never thought of as Nattrass and Seekings (2006) show that the economic growth that Mbeki was obsessed with came with large inequalities and that it was growth that did not create employment. Instead, it actually cut employment creation. Thus for the left within the alliance structure they had to remove the *1996 class project* and Polokwane provided them with the platform to do so.

The reason for this battle I argue here is the fact that ANC members see the party as machinery to access state resources and to forge patronage networks. The fact that branches and municipalities are both the party and the state's organs that are closest to the people makes them contested spaces. Thus the protests in the ward were not because of lack of service delivery, which certainly is the case in some areas, but because some ANC members wanted to position themselves for the councillorship in the 2011 government election. As the ward councillor in Manzini, Mr Sibeko, noted, the reason why there was a '*service delivery*' protest in the branch was not because of the lack of service delivery but because people wanted jobs and some positioned themselves for his position (ward councillor) in the next local government elections. Thus it is contested whether these mass protests are really about the lack of service delivery or about access to state resources. "But these protests are more than just about failure of service delivery in the narrow sense... The protest also involves other issues...Internal power struggles within the ANC-led movement. This includes key activists positioning themselves to become councillors in 2011 by mobilising against the current councillors. Of course, their ability to do so is linked to the poor performance of many councillors. But the struggles are also about access to tenders and other opportunities for profiting. The power struggles are also, in some cases, residues of the Polokwane battles. The

power struggles also relate to other issues too” (Yunus Carrim: 2009). The internal fights within the ANC which are largely about access to state resources leads to members of the party revolting against each other and, at times, instigating ‘service delivery protests’ against their own councillor, to put themselves in line to be the next councillor. The reason for this in-fighting is because of the patronage network that certain individuals and their supporters want to forge. If an individual is elevated to the position of being councillor of the party he or she will dish-out patronage to his or her backers, be it through jobs or tenders. But as councillor Sibeko noted, this is not the case as this position of being a councillor does not come or have the powers that many think it has. Yes it has perks, but not power and influence in the tendering and employment processes of the municipality.

The reason which some of my participants argued was the main reason that made them protest against the ward councillor and his ward committee was the fact that they are failing to employ them in the municipality. The blurring of the party and the state is one that leads to people and in particular ANC members seeing the state, in this case the Mbombela municipality, as part of the ANC. Thus for them [ANC members] the fact that their ward councillor is part of the Mbombela mayoral council means that he has to employ them because the municipality is under the party, meaning the municipality becomes an extended arm of the party. This could explain why many of them were frustrated by the fact that the ward councillor was failing to employ them, because for them being in the mayoral committee equals employing your own cadres of the party because the municipality is under the party. Thus one BEC member argued that there was no difference between the party and the state or any level of government under the ANC. The blurring of the party and the state could explain why at the end people protest against their own members who are , in this case the ward councillor. Because they tend to be frustrated by the fact that their own cadres are failing to hire them when they get to positions of power, or fail to dish out patronage, which in most cases is promised by certain members when they want to be elected or nominated to positions of power in the party. Thus the ANC end up protesting against their own if such networks are not created by an incumbent and rally behind someone they think will forge these patronage networks.

The revolt against certain individuals within the party, in particular the ANC ward councillor by ANC members, shows that the members are not just frustrated by the lack of service delivery but by the fact that they do not benefit from the patronage networks which they associate with the councillor and the municipality. Members of the party see the victory of an ANC candidate in the local government elections as one that can forge patronage networks with the municipality. Thus most of my participants argued that they attended ANC meetings and mostly those that are convened by the ANC councillor because if the councillor sees them in such meetings, when employment opportunities come in the ward they would be the first in line to get such jobs. The so-called service delivery protests that are mostly organised by those members who want to position themselves for the councillorship, I argue, result from the belief that being a ward councillor can give them access to state resources, through the municipality and the perks that come with the position. “Many have taken politics as career thus the fight for positions within the party and to be councillors because that’s where the money is” (Councillor Sibeko: 02/04/2011). The fact that the position of being a councillor comes with perks and that some members of the party see their involvement in the ANC as a career path, could explain why people fight for the position of being a ward councillor. Thus certain members even wage protests against their own fellow members of the ANC who are councillors in the guise of *service delivery protests* because they want to discredit current ANC councillors and position themselves for the post. Thus in this ward Councillor Sibeko, did not even stand as an ANC candidate in the up-coming local government election. Many wanted him out, citing among other things that he had failed the community and the unemployed in particular, by failing to hire them even though he was in the mayoral committee. The *service delivery protest* also had an impact on his chances of retaining his positions of being the councillor again, hence he cited his reason for not wanting the post again as follows: “being a councillor is tough. You are constantly under attack you build a house they say is their money, you buy a car is their money, everything you do is their money. As if the municipality gives us [councillor] money to do projects in our wards. I had enough of this, I can only stand as a PR [Proportional Representative] councillor and be far from the masses not as a ward councillor” (Councillor Sibeko: Interview: 05/09/2010). This shows that the post of ward councillor, even though it comes with perks, can make personal achievements attributable to the fact that one is a councillor and that the peoples’ monies are used to advance one’s life. Thus Councillor Sibeko argued that the job of being a councillor is stressful and taxing thus he does not want it anymore. Their role is one of being an ‘information broker’ as Malebela (2010) argues, relaying information from the community to

the municipality and back to their communities, and their position actually does not have as much influence in the decision processes of the municipality as through the ANC caucus. Their function is one of being an information bridge between the municipality and their communities.

Dlamini (2010) and Benit-Gbaffou (2008) argue that the real power of the ward councillor and his or her major influence comes with the fact that they have the power to appoint the Community Liaising Officer (CLOs). These CLOs “are supposed to serve as a bridge between the community and construction companies” (Dlamini, 2010: 197). But he also notes that one of the CLOs in his area was also a subcontractor who benefited from the jobs that they were doing. This indicates how these processes are manipulated and the fact that the councillor has the power to make these appointments means that those who want to benefit from these small community projects and have business ambitions can rally behind one candidate that promises to choose them as the CLO of a particular ward. The ward councillor in this light is seen as a source of patronage by the unemployed and those who want employment in these small community projects. It is crucial that when one looks at the functioning of the branch one also investigates how much such small projects can mean to the majority of the unemployed and why some within the ANC, because they feel sidelined by an incumbent councillor, can decide to revolt against him or her for monopolising patronage networks and supporting someone who they think will unleash patronage. But as noted above, the ward councillor in this ward, councillor Sibeko, argues that the ANC has the power to decide who become the CLO when projects come to the ward. This clearly shows that the BEC in this case is the one that has the power to appoint a CLO with the councillor only offering advice on the guidelines on the processes that should be followed and requirements for a CLO. The BEC has the power to decide who should be the CLO, which is a position that comes with a stipend, thus those members of the party that are loyal to the party are rewarded by this position. The councillor cited the fact that all of the CLOs that have been employed in all the projects that have been done during his tenure as a councillor have all been unemployed ANC members chosen by the ANC’s BEC. This could explain why people attend ANC meetings, because of the fact that they want to be seen as participating in the life of the organisation and also that they are loyal members of the party, which could be rewarded by the job of being a CLO.

Manzini (Chochocho) has a population of 17693 and only 3183 people employed out of a population of 5583 economically active people (Census: 2001). The fight for jobs in the ward when small projects come to the ward is fierce and bound to cause factions within the community and mostly with the ANC itself. As some participants in the study argued that they attended ANC meeting to forge connections with the councillor and other senior ANC members who have power and can employ them. Some argued that if they do not know you (ANC powerful members in the branch and the councillor) one would not get a job. “The concerned group that protested against service delivery, did not protest because there was lack of service delivery. They protested because they wanted jobs, the only thing they wanted was jobs and thought that through the protests they will get jobs” (Councillor Sibeko: Interview: 01/09/2010). This participant also noted that the majority of these protestors were ANC members, the ANC was revolting against itself (ANC). The reason for this could be the fact that these ANC members felt that they were not benefitting from the current ANC councillor who was failing to employ them. Thus the protest was seen by many in the ward, even the ward councillor, as one that was about employment. This could explain why in this thesis I argue that some of the internal fights within the ANC which manifest through the so called ‘service delivery protests’ are because of the fact that people associate joining the ANC with an opportunities for getting employment and because of the patronage networks that joining the party promises. This occurs especially within the local scale of government through the community-works projects, which promote the employment of the locals over which the councillor has massive influence.

“Tsine (we) applied for our jobs sesisebenta (already working)” [those jobs] (Peter, Interview: 25/08/2010) This was a statement made by one participant in an informal discussion we had about how people get employed in the branch. This clearly shows how patronage networks work in the branch and that those who are lucky get employed because they are ANC members. The reason that this participant gave for applying for a job which he was already in, was the fact that he knew the people who were responsible for hiring in that department and knew them through the ANC branch. This clearly shows that members of the ANC who happen to know the right people within the party and who have power have the chance of actually reaping the rewards because of their loyalty to the party. Thus some people

fight for certain individuals to be in power or to be elected as councillors so that they benefit when these individuals are in power, or are councillors, through the patronage networks that they form. “Money is used within the ANC and jobs in the municipality are used to reward disciplined comrades of the movement” (Interview: 1/09/2010). This participant noted that these disciplined cadres of the movement, that he was talking about were those who did not challenge decisions of the party especially the regional and the BEC leaders of the party. He argued that if one is vocal within these structures and questions a lot of decisions that are made by the party, “you won’t get employed at the municipality or government. They (REC and BEC members) usually say ‘ja! Shokusti uyatsandza kuhlala la-eskomu angasebenti’ (Yes! He loves staying at in the village or at home and not working) that is if you are vocal and challenge their authority” (Joseph, Interview: 1/09/2010). This clearly shows that the ANC has the power to hire people especially at the municipal level, thus they could utter such statements. This could also be linked to the political clientelism that Benit-Gbaffou (2010) noted, where public goods, including employment is used by the party to reward voters and I add, to reward disciplined cadres of the movement.

5.4 The ANC branch and accountability of the of the ward councillor

The ward councillor and the branch member’s relationship, which is associated with patronage, is a burden on the accountability of the councillor to the community, for the patronage network undermines the fact that the councillor has to be accountable to the people that he or she represents. How can the ward councillor be accountable if his relationship with the branch is underlined by patronage? If the branch and the councillor relationship is one that is based on political-clientelism, how then can one expect the councillor to be accountable to the masses? This section of the chapter will try to look at some of the aspects that undermine the accountability of the ward councillors to the community that they represent.

The Local Government Municipal Structures Act of 1998 which provides for the election of councillors notes:

“Councillors are elected to represent local communities on municipal councils, to ensure that municipalities have structured mechanisms of accountability to local communities, and to meet the priority needs of communities by providing services equitably, effectively and sustainably within the means of the municipality. In fulfilling this role councillors must be accountable to local communities and report back at least quarterly to constituencies on council matters, including the performance of the municipality in terms of establishing indicators...” (Local Municipal Structures Act of 1998: 94).

The role of the councillors as highlighted above is one that serves as a bridge between the community and the municipality, thus Malabela and Ally (2011) calls them the *information brokers*, what is of most significance of the role of the councillor is that he or she has to be accountable to the people that he or she represents. But with the party list where councillors are elected into their positions under the banner of a particular political party the councillors are in a very difficult position. The councillor has to account to the party and the community at the same time. Many participants cited the fact that the link between the ANC branch and the municipality and *vice-versa* was through the ward councillor. This means that the branch of the ANC, if it needs something from the municipality, has to attain it through the ward councillor, which at times might be contradictory to what the people want on the ground. One municipal official, Mr Sgudla, notes the link of the branch and the municipality: “We don’t work with the ANC branch directly, they use their ward councillor to make sure that their policy positions are represented in the municipality. This goes for all political parties not only the ANC. Even though councillors might represent a specific political party but when their elected as ward councillor they do not only represent ANC members in their branch but the ward as a whole” (Interview: 27/09/2010). What is significant from this quote is that even though councillors might represent certain parties in the municipal council and have to champion the needs and policy positions of their respective parties, they most importantly represent the people in their communities and have to account to them. The ward councillor is then caught in-between the party and the community, toeing the party line and also accounting to the community as a whole.

Mr Sgudla argued that ward committees were established to make sure that councillors are accountable to the community and that they do not submit to the party and undermine the

interests of their community. But in Chochocho with the dominance of the ANC and an all ANC ward committee it becomes difficult to draw the line between the party and the community. As I argue elsewhere, Malabela and Ally (2011), that there is no difference between the ward system(ward councillor and ward committees) and the ANC. Ward meetings which are supposed to deal with service delivery matters and the councillor accounting to the ward become subverted by ANC branch politics, making them an extended arm of the ANC branch. Piper and Deacon (2008) term it the *dominant party syndrome*. the dominance of the ANC in Manzini has led to people being reluctant to attend meetings that are about service delivery issues because they are dominated by ANC politics and are not about service delivery. Councillor Sibeko also noted that it is difficult being a ward councillor as one has to be accountable to both the party and the community. “Remember I am an ANC ward councillor I have to report to them and they also have to mandate me on what I have to take to council [municipal council]” (Councillor Sibeko. Interview: 05/09/2010). Linking the ANC with the municipality through the ward councillor weakens accountability of the councillor to the communities. As highlighted above internal squabbles within the party, in this case the ANC branch can affect the functioning of the councillor as different factions might want different objectives which are contradicting each other. The failure of the ward councillor might also be used as a tool to settle internal battles within the ANC branch. Thus if accountability is to be achieved the ward councillor should be autonomous from the ANC branch, even though some might argue, why, then, have the councillor campaigning under the ANC banner if they will be autonomous, Then they must contest elections as independent candidates.

5.5 Conclusion

Patronage networks through the branch and the municipality are one of the main factors that can help us understand why people participate in ANC activities, especially those that require the man power, like mass mobilisation for the party through door-to-door, ‘*imvuselelo*’ campaigns and internal election processes of the party. The fact that backing a particular candidate can result in a job or that if one is seen at ANC meetings one stands a good chance of getting employed explains why people attend ANC branch meetings. It can also explain why branches tend to die between elections and elective congresses, and only revitalise when

elections and congresses come because it is then the party needs the masses to carry out the mass work of the party and then the elite needs the masses to elect them to positions of power. And people get rewarded for their participation and supporting certain individuals most of the time by getting jobs. The patronage function of the branch can also explain why some people, not even the majority, continue to participate in party activities even between elective congresses and elections. Their continued participation can serve as a sign that they are loyal to the party and could be rewarded with a job by the party bosses. Thus I argue here that the reason why people participate in this lower structure of the party is the fact that the branch is where patronage networks are forged. This explains why certain branches have revolted for the fact that their preferred candidates for councillorships were overlooked and loyal members of certain leaders were nominated by the top leadership of the party. Because patronage networks are forged on the ground and the branch and municipalities, which are seen as the closest spheres of both the party and the government respectively, are fiercely contested because they offer access to state resources. The lack of accountability of the ward councillor to the community can also be attributed to the fact that the relationship between the ward councillor and the ANC branch is one that is informed by patronage. This can explain why merit and skills are overlooked when the ANC branch nominates its candidates for councillorship, disciplined cadres and those that have struggle credentials are rewarded with being an ANC councillor.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

“Mr Vavi warned that if workers failed to take control of the ANC, the party could soon lose the country to the DA. ‘If we are not careful, and if we allow people to take our movement [ANC] in the direction they are taking it, very soon we may have to call someone President Zille- which will be an absolute nightmare’” (Business Day 06 April 2011)

The warning given by COSATU General Secretary Zwelindzima Vavi is one that is not far fetched if we consider what the ANC branch has become lately. Looking at the ANC branch and how it has become a space where party positions are contested and how internal democracy is being undermined, it is not long before people will stop participating or will start looking elsewhere to engage politically. Yes, the ANC argues that the branch is the ‘basic unit’ of the organisation where members practice their basic democratic right in the organisation. But it has been affected by some elements that undermine the democratic nature of the branch. These include the fact that branches are manipulated by individuals who want to be leaders in the party, which most of the time are those who have money, meaning that only those who have money get into political office of the party. The fact that branches have 90 percent voting power in all elective congresses or conferences of the party means that those who want political office in the party have to get support from them: the more support a candidate has from branches, the more likely they are to secure a position in the upper structures of the party. Thus the Polokwane Narrative offered by Jacob Dlamini (2010) argues that the ascendance of Jacob Zuma to the throne of the party in 2007 in Polokwane was due to the support that he managed to secure from branches. The significance of the branches in the election processes of the party is what has led to the demise of internal democracy within the party, because money is pumped into branches by ambitious leaders to manipulate election outcomes in branches. Branches are no longer there to offer members the opportunity to actually participate in the life of the organisation and shape policies of the party, but are there for instrumental reasons. Thus elite democracy theorists like Robert Michels (1958) would have argued that what has become of the branch is what happens to organisations as they grow. They only consult the masses when they want to elect leaders and the masses delegate their powers to the leaders who in turn run the organisation as they see fit. But with

that said it is also important to note that branches on the other hand do have power to change leaders who they think are not championing their needs and to replace them with those that they prefer as leaders. As Butler (2009) notes : “[t]he rise of Zuma was also fuelled by branch-level discontent about the monopolisation of patronage opportunities by the incumbents, poor service delivery, and the general high-handedness and arrogance that characterised the higher-reaches – or even the middling ones of Mbeki’s administration” (Butler, 2009: 68-9).

The manipulation of the branch has lead to the commercialisation of the branch, which happens when certain members of the branch are members because their membership has been bought for or paid-up by some individual who instructs them how to vote in BGMs which elect leaders of the branch. These members are then there (in the branch) not to participate in the branch’s life and to practice their democratic right, but only to lend their backing to a particular individual in the BEC of the branch. This also affects the life of the branch because when the branch has to launch or elect new BEC members these members no longer participate in the branch, and it is the failure to launch or elect the new BEC which leads to the disbandment of the branch. Thus in my research members of the branch spoke of ‘*members-of-members*’: these are members of the ANC who join the ANC branch because they are following or want to vote for a certain individual and when that particular individual has voted in the party or has subsequently moved up the ranks of the party they no longer participate in the branch. Some leaders of the branch also spoke of their ‘*members*’ who were the people that were responsible for voting them into power. If these tendencies can be avoided or remedied, the branch promises to be a very strategic position for the party to champion the needs of communities and to make sure that policies of the party are those that coincide with the interests of the masses on the ground and that leaders account to the masses.

With internal democracy undermined at the branch level of the party as highlighted above the most significance role that the branch plays is that of mobilising for the party during election and elective congresses. Tordoff (1993) argues that the mobilisation function of political parties is important, as for parties to be legitimate, they must win elections that are declared free and fair. Thus mobilising the masses to support the party in such an election is crucial.

The ANC, since coming to power in 1994, has implemented door-to-door campaigning for the party and this activity is carried out at the branch level. Senior ANC leaders, including the president of the party, descend on the masses and join branches in carrying out this campaign. With the party approaching its centenary they have implemented the 'Imvuselelo campaign' which aims at making sure that the party has one million members by 2012, the year it celebrates its foundation a century previously, and also to help the campaign for the party in the 2011 Local Government elections. Branches, I argue here, are mostly used by the ANC for their mobilisation function to win elections. The branch under study here was only revitalised at the dawn of the elections, when members started to attend meetings. The fact that the branch had to nominate its candidate for the councillorship was the main instigator of the revitalisation of the branch, as members wanted to make sure that they nominated their preferred candidate. After the nomination processes had unfolded, the main concern of the branch was about winning the Local Government elections and all meetings were about nothing but elections and door-to-door canvassing for the party. Thus I conclude that the branch is mostly used for mobilisation, and thus it comes to the life just prior to elections and then effectively goes into something of a recession. Documents of the party about the state of the organisation, which include the SG organisational report in congresses and NGC, highlight the fact that branches die between elections and conferences and only to be revived just before them again.

The revival of branches just before elections and conferences of the party does not mean that there are no branch activities in between these events. Suffice it to say that the branch does continue to operate, but at a very low level of activity. But at these times, members participate because of the hope that they have in the branch as a potential access point for employment. Most of my participants argued that they participated in the branch because they were hoping that they would get employed. One argued that to get a job, one needs connections and these connections could only be forged in the ANC branch with the senior ANC members most of whom were in government. Many equate joining the ANC with access to employment, thus blurring of the line between the party and the state. People have come to associate being a leader of the party with a government position, that if you lead the party at any level you are rewarded with a post in government through the cadre deployment policy of the ANC. Thus there is a fierce contest of leadership within the ANC because being a party leader is seen as a stepping stone to a government position which opens up access to

state resources. Thus branches are contested for people see being a branch chairperson as an automatic nominee of being the candidate for the party as a councillor, which is a position that comes with perks. This could explain why there has been an outcry from within the ANC over who should represent the party as councillors in the up-coming Local Government elections. Some complain that their preferred candidates have been overlooked by the regional offices of the ANC.

“As (sic) the same time comrades, we must acknowledge that some comrades have a reason to be aggrieved. It is true that in some cases, popular candidates of the people have fallen victim to the powerful cliques who have appointed themselves gatekeepers. It is true that in some cases guidelines have been side stepped and frustrated. In some cases political spaces is monopolised by those who have money” (Vavi. www.policalweb.co.za).

This statement made by the Vavi in his address to the NUMSA (National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa) National Bargaining Conference, notes the manipulation of branches and the failure of the ANC to adhere to the voices of the people when they choose their own candidates for councillorship. The revolt against the ANC by its members is due to the fact that even though branches and communities were afforded the chance to choose who they wanted as the candidates of the party to represent them in the Local Government election, the uppers structure of the party, the Regional office, had the power to decide who should represent the party. This was seen as an insult to communities and branches which thus revolted against the party.

The power of the regional office of the ANC also has an impact on the functioning of the branch because every decision of the branch has to be reviewed or be approved by the regional office of the ANC. Thus some participants argued that the region is the one that is affecting the functioning of the branch and of the municipality. One municipal official complained that the infighting at both the regional and provincial offices of the ANC affects the functioning of the Mbombela Municipality. Thus factional battles may possibly lead to the re-calling of the mayor or him not retaining his position for being allegedly responsible for delivery failures, when the real issue relates to personal interests of those engaged in local level strife. Thus this official argued that all ANC led municipalities which were performing

well had good and functional ANC structures. Ward councillors of the party who are caught in these in fights of the party then fail to account to their communities as they have to toe the party line and at times it might be contradictory to the needs of their communities. Thus the relationship is at times informed by patronage networks, with members of the ANC being clients and the councillor the patron.

The patronage networks are highlighted by the fact that of the members of the party, those that participate in the life of the organisation between conferences and elections, are doing so for material reasons. Jobs are what they are after, one even argued that they mobilise for the party in door-to-door campaigns and support candidates in leadership battles and for councillorship because they would be rewarded. The branch, for such members, is a space where they join patronage networks, and their participation in the branch will be rewarded. Thus most of the people who participate in the door-to-door campaigning of the ANC are the unemployed and the youth because of what is in it for them. The party itself applauds these volunteers who partake in the door-to-door canvassing of the party during elections without any individual interests or expecting material gains. But the truth is that people or members of the party partake in most party activities because of what is in it for them, even though there are some authentic cadres of the ANC in branches.

Without the manipulation of branches by those who have money, branches could again become a very significant sphere of the party that could promote participatory democracy and legitimise the ANC and its government. But if branches continue to serve primarily as vehicles for the promotion of personal and factional interests, Vavi's warning of a '*President Zille*' could indeed become a reality.

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Appendix:

Consent Form:

I hereby agree to participate in this research titled: “The ANC and Local Democracy: The role of the ANC branch in Manzini and Mbombela Municipality”. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am not forced to participate. I also understand that I can withdraw from the interview if I wish not to continue with the interview and that my decision would not affect me negatively.

I understand that the research will not directly benefit me and I will not be rewarded for participating.

I have received the contact details of the researcher as well as his research supervisor which I can contact should I wish to get in touch with them or have any questions regarding my interview. I also understand that feedback will be given back to me in a form of a research report at my request.

I understand that the consent form will not be attached to my interview and my name will not be stated in the research report.

Signature of participant: _____

Date: _____

Consent form for recording interview:

I hereby agree that my interview can be recorded and I understand that it will be transcribed and that the researcher will use a pseudo name to secure some level of anonymity and confidentiality in labelling my interview.

I understand that the researcher will store the recordings of the interview in his computer and the material will be saved under a document which will be secure by a password that will be known by the researcher only.

I understand that only the research and his supervisor will only have access to the recordings of our interview and I can also get the recordings at my request.

Signature of participant: _____

Date: _____

Information sheet ordinary ANC members:

My name is Musawenkosi Malabela a Sociology Masters student at the University of the Witwatersrand. As a fulfillment of my masters programme I am undertaking a research and my research topic is: “The ANC and Local Democracy: The Role of the ANC branch in Manzin (Chochocho)- Mbombela”. In this study I want to understand the role of the ANC branch in relation to municipalities, in particular the Mbombela Municipality. I will be sitting in branch meetings and interviewing ANC members of both Branch Executive Council (BEC) members and ordinary members as well as municipal officials.

As an ordinary ANC member you are one of the participants that I wish to interview and would like you to participate in my study. Your participation would help me to understand the role of the ANC branch and how it relates to the local Municipality-Mbombela Municipality. The importance of your perspective on the role of the ANC branch is the fact that you are an ANC member and deal with issues that affect the branch and would like to know how you also deal with the Mbombela municipality- how do you get your voice as a branch heard at the municipality. Your participation in this study is voluntary and will not be rewarded in any way and should you wish to withdraw your participation in this study please let me know. The Duration of the interview is between 30 minutes and an hour.

Your name will not be required in the interview and in the final report you won't be mentioned by your real name I will use pseudo name. Instead I will refer to you as an ordinary ANC member. While you will not be mentioned, the name of the ANC branch will be mentioned.

Your participation will help me in understanding the role ANC and local democracy and also to fulfil the requirements of my Masters degree which is a research report.

Researcher: Musawenkosi Malabela

Telephone: 011 717 4449

Cell: 076 369 0642

Email: musamalabela@gmail.com

Supervisor: Professor Roger Southall

Telephone: 011 717 4451

Email: Roger.Southall@wits.ac.za

Information sheet ANC Branch Executive Members:

Hi, my name is Musawenkosi Malabela a Sociology Masters student at the University of the Witwatersrand. As a fulfillment of my masters programme I am undertaking research and my research topic is: “The ANC and Local Democracy: The Role of the ANC branch in Manzini (Chochocho)- Mbombela”. In this study I want to understand the role of the ANC branch in relation to municipalities, in particular the Mbombela Municipality. I will be sitting in branch meetings and interviewing ANC members of both Branch Executive Council (BEC) members and ordinary members as well as municipal officials.

As a BEC member you are one of the participants I wish to interview and would like you to participate in my study. Your participation would help me to understand the role of the ANC branch and how it relates to the local Municipality- Mbombela Municipality. The importance of your perspective on the role of the ANC branch is the fact that you are in the leadership of the branch and you have to deal with issues that affect the branch and would like to know how you also deal with the Mbombela municipality- how do you get your voice as a branch heard at the municipality. Your participation in this study is voluntary and will not be rewarded in any way and should you wish to withdraw your participation in this study please let me know. The Duration of the interview is between 30 minutes and an hour.

Your confidentiality and anonymity cannot be promised as the name of the branch is in my research topic and would be in my report. But what I can guarantee you, is that in this interview I do not want your name and in the actual research report I will not name your real name will use pseudo names. When making reference to this interview, all I will use pseudo names or indicate that a BEC member 1 or 2 argued “that.....”. Without actually giving out your name and also I will not name you position in the branch as people can trace who I am referring to.

Researcher: Musawenkosi Malabela

Telephone: 011 717 4449

Cell: 076 369 0642

Email: musamalabela@gmail.com

Supervisor: Professor Roger Southall

Telephone: 011 717 4451

Email: Roger.Southall@wits.ac.za

Information sheet to municipal officials:

Hi my name is Musawenkosi Malabela a Sociology Masters student at the University of the Witwatersrand. As a fulfillment of my masters programme I am undertaking research and my research topic is: “The ANC and Local Democracy: The Role of the ANC branch in Manzini (Chochocho)- Mbombela”. In this study I want to understand the role of the ANC branch in relation to municipalities, in particular the Mbombela Municipality. I will be sitting in branch meetings and interviewing ANC members of both Branch Executive Council (BEC) members and ordinary members as well as municipal officials.

As a municipal official you are one of the participants I would like to interview to get a clear understanding on how you deal with ANC branches. And being an ANC-led municipality how you deal with the ANC, and which structures of the ANC do you deal with directly. Your input in this study will help in understanding the relationship between the municipality and the ANC branch. Your participation in this research is voluntary and would not be rewarded in any form and should you wish to withdraw your participation in this research please let me know. The Duration of the interview is between 30 minutes to an hour.

Anonymity and confidentiality cannot be guaranteed as the municipality is named in my title and will also be named in my research report. I would try to maintain some level of confidentiality and anonymity, I will not use your real name instead I will create a pseudo name for you and would not be associated with your name or job title. I would also not say what job you do in the municipality.

Should you have further question and require clarity regarding you participation in this research please feel free to contact me or my supervisor and our contact details are as follows:

Researcher: Musawenkosi Malabela

Telephone: 011 717 4449

Cell: 076 369 0642

Email: musamalabela@gmail.com

Supervisor: Professor Roger Southall

Telephone: 011 717 4451

Email: Roger.Southall@wits.ac.za

Information Sheet for Branch distribution:

Hi my name is Musawenkosi Malabela a Sociology Masters student at the University of the Witwatersrand. As a fulfillment of my masters programme I am undertaking research and my research topic is: “The ANC and Local Democracy: The Role of the ANC branch in Manzini (Chochocho)- Mbombela”. In this study I want to understand the role of the ANC branch in relation to municipalities, in particular the Mbombela Municipality. I will be sitting in branch meetings and interviewing ANC members of both Branch Executive Council (BEC) members and ordinary members as well as municipal officials.

Should you have any questions pertaining my research feel free to ask me question or contact me or my supervisor on the contacts listed here.

Researcher: Musawenkosi Malabela

Telephone: 011 717 4449

Cell: 076 369 0642

Email: musamalabela@gmail.com

Supervisor: Professor Roger Southall

Telephone: 011 717 4451

Email: Roger.Southall@wits.ac.za

